Déchiffrer 2027

FREN

Debt and public spending, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

Handling of the debt: Borrow from the Banque de France, large tax-free national loan

Direction of change: change of another kind, or uncertain direction, compared with current law.

The lever. What the programme plans for public debt: repayment, ring-fencing, buyback or cancellation by the central bank, restructuring. Direction rule: ↑ higher targeted debt; ↓: debt reduced.

« Rapatrier le pouvoir monétaire, bancaire et financier en France (actuellement à Francfort et à la BCE) et réviser le fonctionnement des lois bancaires et financières (1973, 1984, traités de Maastricht et de Lisbonne de 1992 et 2008) pour emprunter directement auprès de la Banque de France, redevenue autonome. […] Un grand emprunt national offrant un avantage fiscal aux Français permettra de reprendre le contrôle de notre dette et de conforter notre nouvelle monnaie à l’exemple du Japon. »1

Translation by the editorsBring monetary, banking and financial power back to France (currently in Frankfurt and at the ECB) and revise the operation of the banking and financial laws (1973, 1984, Maastricht and Lisbon treaties of 1992 and 2008) in order to borrow directly from the Banque de France, made autonomous again. […] A large national loan offering a tax advantage to the French will make it possible to regain control of our debt and to strengthen our new currency, following the example of Japan.

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

lever that cannot be costed

Lever with no coefficient in the cost schedule: the position is compared, not costed.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Public debt (Maastricht) at end-2025: €3,460.5bn, i.e. 115.6% of GDP. OFCE forecasts: 118.3% in 2026, 119.8% in 2027. General government interest charges: €64.7bn in 2025, i.e. 2.2% of GDP (OFCE: 2.4% in 2026, 2.6% in 2027). Average maturity of State debt: 8.5 years (April 2026).

Horizon. Not applicable in static costing; sensitivity given as a benchmark.

Limits. The « traitement » (treatment) of the debt (cancellation of securities held by the Banque de France, restructuring, ring-fencing, forced loan) is a matter of European law and market confidence: it is not costed statically. Sensitivity benchmark: +100 basis points across the whole yield curve add €3.1bn of interest charges in the 1st year, €7.5bn in the 2nd, €18.4bn in the 5th, €32.1bn in the 10th (negotiable State debt); +1 point of inflation adds €3.0bn (index-linked securities). To be used to assess the effect of a programme on the risk premium, separately from the central figure.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

  1. Debout la France, Notre projet : Économie. Read the programme page.

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