Unemployment, Jean-Luc Mélenchon
Governance of unemployment insurance: Prevent the State from drawing on Unédic funds
Direction of change: change of another kind, or uncertain direction, compared with current law.
The lever. Who sets the rules of unemployment insurance: trade unions and employers (joint management, paritarisme), the State, or a sharing between the two. Direction rule: ↑ greater role for the State.
« Empêcher l’État de prélever dans les caisses de l’Unédic »1Translation by the editorsPrevent the State from drawing on Unédic funds
Encoding
No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The programme does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
lever that cannot be costed
Lever with no coefficient in the cost schedule: the position is compared, not costed.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Scheme managed by Unédic under an agreement between the social partners (agreement of 15 November 2024), approved by the State, which issues a framework letter and takes part of the scheme's revenue.
Horizon. Not applicable.
Limits. Institutional question. Point to note: without the State's levies (€4.1bn), the scheme's balance would be +€1.8bn in 2026 instead of −€2.3bn (Unédic, forecast of 17 June 2026; +€2.0bn in the March forecast).
- Unédic, « Situation financière de l'assurance chômage à horizon 2028 », prévision du 17 juin 2026 (page 13, graphique 11), 2026-06-17: « Lecture : en 2026, le solde prévu est de -2,3 Md€. Sans les prélèvements État de 4,1 Md€, le solde serait de +1,8 Md€ en 2026. »
- Unédic, Signature de la convention du 15 novembre 2024, 2024-11: « convention d'assurance chômage du 15 novembre 2024 (agréée le 19 décembre 2024) »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- L’Avenir en commun (édition 2025), p. 36. Open the document at this page.
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