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Local authorities, Jean-Luc Mélenchon

State grants to local authorities: Rebalance the communes' DGF and index it to inflation

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Sums paid each year by the State to municipalities, départements and regions: amount, distribution, equalisation. Direction rule: ↑ higher grants.

« Rééquilibrer la dotation globale de fonctionnement versée aux communes pour lutter contre les inégalités territoriales et l’indexer sur l’inflation »1

Translation by the editorsRebalance the general operating grant paid to communes to combat territorial inequalities, and index it to inflation

Encoding

Position linked to an option of the cost schedule, with no parameter to set: see the costing.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

−€1.2bn

per year for the public accounts, new spending, range −€1.3bn to −€1bn.

The calculation

  • Communes' DGF (general operating grant) (€12.8bn in 2025) indexed to inflation each year (editors' common assumption: 1.75% per year, 1.5 to 2.0%; five upratings from 2028 to 2032, i.e. a cumulative increase of 9.1% in 2032), compared with a DGF stable in current euros; reading key: a one-point gap for one year costs €0.13bn: Option costed by the source: a cost of €1.16bn (0.99 to 1.33) per year.

Assumption by the editors. Reading adopted: the municipalities' DGF (general operating grant) (€12.8bn in 2025) uprated each year in line with inflation, instead of a stable amount in current euros. Common assumption of the editors: 1.75% inflation a year (1.5 to 2.0%), five upratings from 2028 to 2032. Reading key: one point of gap for one year costs €0.13bn. The rebalancing between municipalities, with no amount, is counted as neutral (within a constant envelope); inter-municipal bodies are not counted.

Coefficient calculated by the editors from réponse du Gouvernement à la question orale n° 545 (Assemblée nationale): the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. State financial transfers: €49bn in the LFI 2025 (€45bn of deductions from revenue and €4bn of appropriations from the RCT mission). DGF: €27bn in 2025, compared with €40bn in 2014. In 2026, the regions' DGF is brought back into the budget (−€5.2bn of transferred VAT) and the effort asked of local authorities is about €3bn. The LPFP 2023-2027 provided for transfers of €53bn in 2023 and €56bn in 2027.

Horizon. Full year; to be expressed relative to the extended LPFP (public finance programming act) path.

Limits. An envelope announced in euros (for example €10bn over five years) is costed through the parameter in €bn per year, €1 announced = €1 of State spending, not as a percentage of State transfers to local authorities. An increase in grants worsens the State balance but not necessarily that of general government as a whole, if local authorities save or invest. The scope (with or without transferred VAT) changes the amounts: €49bn to €56bn. Indexation of the communes' DGF (general operating grant) to inflation (option, rule on public bases of 18 October 2026): same common assumption as for the public sector pay index point and pensions, inflation of 1.75% per year at the centre (Cour des comptes), 1.5 to 2.0% for the range, first effect on 1 January 2028, cost in 2032 = cumulative gap of five upratings with the current rule (a DGF set each year in the finance act, which remained at €27.4bn in 2025 and in 2026). Communes' DGF in 2025: €12.8bn (Government); 12.8 × (1.0175^5 − 1) = €1.16bn (12.8 × 7.73% = 0.99; 12.8 × 10.41% = 1.33; editors' calculations, 2025 euros). Reading key: one point of indexation for one year is worth €0.128bn for the communes, €0.27bn for the whole DGF. Inter-municipal bodies, departments and regions are not counted. The DILICO (cyclical smoothing mechanism for local authority revenue: €740m in 2026, paid by the regions, the departments and the inter-municipal bodies, 90% paid back to the contributors in thirds over three years, 10% to the horizontal equalisation funds) places local revenue in reserve and returns it to local authorities: as the whole levy goes back to local authorities, abolishing it costs the State nothing in 2032: if renewed each year, that year's levy is returned in 2032 through the repayments of previous years; if not renewed, it no longer exists (editors' reading).

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Jean-Luc Mélenchon

  1. L’Avenir en commun (édition 2025), p. 17. Open the document at this page.

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