Minimum incomes and benefits, Marine Tondelier
Minimum income for under-25s: Autonomy guarantee open from 18 to young people who are fiscally independent
Direction of change: creation of a scheme, compared with current law.
The lever. Minimum income open to 18-25-year-olds, currently excluded from the RSA (minimum income) save for exceptions: creation, conditions, or support schemes. Direction rule: ↑ higher minimum or open to more young people.
« Étendre la protection sociale aux jeunes adultes par l’extension de la garantie d’autonomie dès 18 ans pour toutes les personnes indépendantes fiscalement »1Translation by the editorsExtend social protection to young adults by extending the autonomy guarantee from age 18 to all fiscally independent persons
Encoding
No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The programme does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
not costed
Autonomy guarantee (50% of the net SMIC) open from age 18 to young people who are fiscally independent: neither this amount nor this group matches the options (an income of €461 for all 18-24-year-olds), and no static costing has been read.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. No general minimum social benefit before 25: the RSA (minimum income) is open to 18-24-year-olds only for single parents or young people with a sufficient period of work. The youth commitment contract (contrat d'engagement jeune) opens entitlement to an allowance of at most €566.17 per month for an adult who is independent for tax purposes or attached to a non-taxable household (€339.70 if each income share of the household falls in the first bracket of the scale; €226.48 for a minor), compared with €651.69 for the RSA of a single person (service-public, April 2026).
Horizon. Full year, €bn per year, at 2018 legislation and prices
Limits. IPP simulations from 2018 of a « revenu de base » [“basic income”] merging the RSA and the in-work benefit, paid automatically (100% take-up), with a minimum of €461 per month, lower than the current RSA of €651.69. Low: 34% non-take-up applied (DREES), i.e. about 7.8. High: uprating in proportion to the RSA since 2018, i.e. about 14 (calculations by the editors, without microsimulation). The IPP points out that detaching young people from their parents' tax household partly reduces the cost (lower family quotient), already counted. The programmes' « garanties d'autonomie » [“autonomy guarantees”] (at the poverty line, or at 50% of the net SMIC, for young people detached from the parental tax household) have no equivalent in the cost schedule: the options simulate an income of €461 for all 18-24 year-olds. No static costing of these schemes has been read.
- service-public.gouv.fr, fiche F32700 « Contrat d’engagement jeune (CEJ) », vérifiée le 1er avril 2026, 2026-04-01: « Majeur fiscalement autonome ou rattaché à un foyer non imposable L'allocation est de 566,17 € par mois maximum. […] Majeur fiscalement autonome ou rattaché à un foyer imposable Chaque part de revenu du foyer doit être comprise dans la 1re tranche du barème. L'allocation est de 339,70 € par mois maximum. […] L'allocation est de 226,48 € pour un mineur »
- IPP, Rapport n° 18, Revenu de base : simulations en vue d'une expérimentation, 2018-06: « L'éligibilité à ce revenu de base à partir de 21 ans coûterait 5,2 milliards d'euros annuels de dépenses supplémentaires […] abaisser l'âge d'éligibilité à 18 ans coûte 6,6 milliards d'euros supplémentaires, pour un coût total de 16,2 milliards »
- IPP, Rapport n° 18, scénario incluant les aides au logement, 2018-06: « L'abaissement de l'âge minimal à 21 ans coûte 6,1 milliards d'euros supplémentaires […] L'étendue de l'éligibilité aux 18-20 ans augmente le coût total de 8,1 milliards d'euros »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- Pour une prospérité écologique, programme des Écologistes, p. 126. Open the document at this page.
Contest this encoding (prefilled email; procedure and deadlines)