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FREN

Age and contribution period, Gabriel Attal

Contribution period: Contribution period only, with a genuine penalty and a genuine bonus

Direction of change: change of another kind, or uncertain direction, compared with current law.

The lever. Number of years of contributions required to receive a full-rate pension, without reduction. Direction rule: ↑ longer required period.

« Un système libre en ne gardant que la durée de cotisation avec une vraie décote pour ceux qui partent tôt et une vraie surcote pour ceux qui travaillent plus longtemps. »1

Translation by the editorsA free system keeping only the contribution period, with a real penalty for those who leave early and a real bonus for those who work longer.

Words of Gabriel Attal, Le Journal du Dimanche, entretien, 1 August 2026. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme.

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Contribution period only, with stronger penalty and bonus, with no duration or rate: nothing to cost.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Contribution period required for a full-rate pension (Touraine Act of 2014, accelerated in 2023, adjusted by the LFSS 2026): 170 quarters for 1964 and for those born from January to March 1965; 171 for those born from April to December 1965; 172 quarters (43 years) for 1966 and later. Age at which the reduction (décote) no longer applies: 67.

Horizon. Full year 2032, €bn per year, balance of the pension system, static. The effect keeps growing after 2032.

Limits. (1) The phase-in is slow. According to the Cour des comptes, one quarter less only reaches €1bn of impact on the balance in 2034. Four quarters less cost €3.9bn in 2035 and €7.7bn in 2045. Hence a value of €0.5bn to €1bn per quarter in 2032. (2) The figure of €9bn for 160 quarters is a simple linear extrapolation, to be handled with caution: the impact assessment of the 2014 law estimated at €10.4bn per year in 2040 (€5.4bn in 2030), in 2011 euros, the saving from moving from 166 to 172 quarters for all schemes, including supplementary schemes; for the general scheme and the non-balanced basic schemes, €5.6bn in 2040. (3) Macroeconomic effect, presented separately: the Cour des comptes counts €3.2bn of other lost revenue in 2035 for 4 quarters less. (4) Declared overlaps with the legal retirement age (the age coefficient partly includes the effect of the contribution period, through the COR costing; a joint increase of both partly delays the same retirements, common share measured according to the Cnav, report annexed to the PLFRSS 2023, table 5) and with long careers. (5) Long careers react asymmetrically: 80% postpone their retirement if the period increases, 40% bring it forward if it decreases (Prisme model). The figure of €9bn for 160 quarters is a linear extrapolation: it is not used as an option. (6) The « 168 trimestres, 3,9 Md€ » [“168 quarters, €3.9bn”] option is withdrawn: it is a 2035 figure, which gave the same proposal a different value from the parameter (€3bn in 2032). (7) Lengthening. The Cour des comptes costs a one-year lengthening (176 quarters for the 1969 cohort) at €5.2bn for the pension system in 2035, and €9.7bn for public finances as a whole. The increase is therefore costed at its own coefficient, €1.3bn per quarter (5.2 / 4), and not at the coefficient of the decrease: one more quarter reaches €1bn of effect as early as 2030, one quarter less only in 2034 (annex no. 3), hence the lower bound of €1bn. This coefficient is for 2035, not 2032: it slightly overstates the 2032 gain. No costing read beyond 176 quarters. No costing read either for the age at which the reduction (décote) is cancelled (67).

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

  1. Le Journal du Dimanche, entretien, 1 August 2026. Words of Gabriel Attal. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme. Read the source (Le Journal du Dimanche, entretien).

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