Déchiffrer 2027

FREN

Age and contribution period, Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Contribution period: 40 years of contributions for a full-rate pension at 60

Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.

The lever. Number of years of contributions required to receive a full-rate pension, without reduction. Direction rule: ↑ longer required period.

« Abroger la réforme d’Emmanuel Macron passant l’âge de départ à la retraite à 64 ans et restaurer le droit à la retraite à 60 ans à taux plein pour 40 annuités de cotisations »1

Translation by the editorsRepeal Emmanuel Macron's reform raising the retirement age to 64 and restore the right to retire at 60 on a full-rate pension for 40 years of contributions

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Common rule: the candidate's most recent source prevails. At the press conference of 14 October 2026 (around 0:46:55), the movement announces « dans un premier temps d'abroger la réforme Borne » [“as a first step, to repeal the Borne reform”], the return « à la retraite à 60 ans » [“to retirement at 60”] coming afterwards, « dans le reste du quinquennat » [“in the rest of the five-year term”], with no timetable; the 40 years of contributions in the 2025 programme go with this return to 60. As for the legal retirement age (first step only, costed at 62), they are not costed. The funding provided for in the same place in the programme is still cited: the contributions on profit-sharing, employee profit participation and employee savings are costed under the “Profit sharing (participation, intéressement)” lever.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Contribution period required for a full-rate pension (Touraine Act of 2014, accelerated in 2023, adjusted by the LFSS 2026): 170 quarters for 1964 and for those born from January to March 1965; 171 for those born from April to December 1965; 172 quarters (43 years) for 1966 and later. Age at which the reduction (décote) no longer applies: 67.

Horizon. Full year 2032, €bn per year, balance of the pension system, static. The effect keeps growing after 2032.

Limits. (1) The phase-in is slow. According to the Cour des comptes, one quarter less only reaches €1bn of impact on the balance in 2034. Four quarters less cost €3.9bn in 2035 and €7.7bn in 2045. Hence a value of €0.5bn to €1bn per quarter in 2032. (2) The figure of €9bn for 160 quarters is a simple linear extrapolation, to be handled with caution: the impact assessment of the 2014 law estimated at €10.4bn per year in 2040 (€5.4bn in 2030), in 2011 euros, the saving from moving from 166 to 172 quarters for all schemes, including supplementary schemes; for the general scheme and the non-balanced basic schemes, €5.6bn in 2040. (3) Macroeconomic effect, presented separately: the Cour des comptes counts €3.2bn of other lost revenue in 2035 for 4 quarters less. (4) Declared overlaps with the legal retirement age (the age coefficient partly includes the effect of the contribution period, through the COR costing; a joint increase of both partly delays the same retirements, common share measured according to the Cnav, report annexed to the PLFRSS 2023, table 5) and with long careers. (5) Long careers react asymmetrically: 80% postpone their retirement if the period increases, 40% bring it forward if it decreases (Prisme model). The figure of €9bn for 160 quarters is a linear extrapolation: it is not used as an option. (6) The « 168 trimestres, 3,9 Md€ » [“168 quarters, €3.9bn”] option is withdrawn: it is a 2035 figure, which gave the same proposal a different value from the parameter (€3bn in 2032). (7) Lengthening. The Cour des comptes costs a one-year lengthening (176 quarters for the 1969 cohort) at €5.2bn for the pension system in 2035, and €9.7bn for public finances as a whole. The increase is therefore costed at its own coefficient, €1.3bn per quarter (5.2 / 4), and not at the coefficient of the decrease: one more quarter reaches €1bn of effect as early as 2030, one quarter less only in 2034 (annex no. 3), hence the lower bound of €1bn. This coefficient is for 2035, not 2032: it slightly overstates the 2032 gain. No costing read beyond 176 quarters. No costing read either for the age at which the reduction (décote) is cancelled (67).

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

  1. L’Avenir en commun, édition 2025 (La France insoumise), version 1 of 28 January 2025, p. 38. Open the document at this page.

Contest this encoding (prefilled email; procedure and deadlines)