Business taxation, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan
Taxation of digital giants and multinationals: Multinationals’ profits taxed pro rata to turnover, tax on data
Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.
The lever. Digital services tax on large platforms, 15% global minimum tax on large groups (European directive), rules against profit shifting to low-tax countries. Direction rule: ↑ heavier taxation of multinationals.
« Instaurer une taxe numérique forfaitaire, pour l’exploitation commerciale des données personnelles des internautes résidant en France et amener les GAFAM à payer leurs impôts en France […] Rétablir une fiscalité loyale en : Imposant le bénéfice consolidé des multinationales au prorata du chiffre d’affaires réalisé dans le pays (recettes supplémentaires de 10 milliards d’euros au bout de 5 ans). Créant une taxe sur l’exploitation des données personnelles (recettes supplémentaires de 5 milliards d’euros au bout de 5 ans). »1Translation by the editorsIntroduce a flat-rate digital tax on the commercial exploitation of the personal data of internet users residing in France and make the GAFAM pay their taxes in France […] Restore fair taxation by: Taxing the consolidated profit of multinationals pro rata to the turnover achieved in the country (additional revenue of €10 billion after 5 years). Creating a tax on the exploitation of personal data (additional revenue of €5 billion after 5 years).
Encoding
No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
+€15bn
per year, gain for the public accounts. « recettes supplémentaires de 10 milliards d’euros au bout de 5 ans » [“additional revenue of €10 billion after 5 years”] (taxation of multinationals) and « recettes supplémentaires de 5 milliards d’euros au bout de 5 ans » [“additional revenue of €5 billion after 5 years”] (tax on the exploitation of personal data)
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
not costed
The cost schedule parameter concerns the rate of the digital services tax, which the position does not target: no administrative source costs the adjustment of multinationals' profits in proportion to the turnover generated in France, nor a flat-rate tax on the exploitation of personal data, whose base and rate are not given. The announced revenue (€15bn after five years) is cited, not counted.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Digital services tax (created in 2019, code des impositions sur les biens et services, Art. L. 453-45 et seq.): 3% of revenue earned in France from digital intermediation, targeted advertising and the sale of data, for companies whose worldwide turnover exceeds €750m and taxable revenue in France €25m; €902m in 2025, €906m forecast for 2026, €981m in the PLF 2027. 15% global minimum tax (Pillar 2, Directive (EU) 2022/2523, transposed from the Finance Act for 2024): in force for 2024 financial years, first collections in 2026 (€500m forecast), no yield forecast for 2027. Since 5 January 2026, the OECD “side-by-side” regime exempts groups that opt for it, starting with groups with a US parent company, from the IIR and UTPR rules, for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2026.
Horizon. Full year; cost = current yield of the tax (static), PLF 2027 forecast as central value, revised forecast for 2026 as lower bound.
Limits. Earmarked revenue: when the position, in the same sentence, earmarks the tax revenue for a named expenditure, that expenditure is counted at the same amount as the costed revenue (central value), via the parameter “spending financed by the tax revenue”; the revenue and the spending each go into their own total. Abolishing the digital services tax is costed at its revenue. The rate parameter applies the average yield of one point at the current rate (coefficient calculated by the editors: €981m / 3; €906m / 3 as lower bound): an increase to 6% or 15% (proposed by amendment in the National Assembly in autumn 2025 without a revenue assessment; the finance act for 2026 kept 3%) is a linear extrapolation, marked as such, that no administrative source (Voies et moyens, impact assessment, general report) costs. Nor does any source cost the adjustment of multinationals' profits in proportion to the turnover achieved in France (« taxation unitaire », unitary taxation): only estimates by elected officials exist, not counted. The global minimum tax has no forecast yield in 2027: according to the Voies et moyens, countries have changed their tax rules and the exceptional contribution of large companies raises their effective rate; a commitment to apply or strengthen it therefore has no yield that can be costed from this source. The tax's yield varies with the platforms' turnover in France; it is not updated to 2032.
- PLF 2027, Évaluation des voies et moyens, tome I (pages 24, 25, 29 et 30), 2026-10: « Elle s’applique à certaines entreprises du secteur numérique dont le chiffre d’affaires mondial dépasse 750 M€ et dont les recettes taxables en France excèdent 25 M€. […] Son taux est fixé à 3 % et porte sur les recettes générées par ces services en France. […] Les recettes se sont élevées à 902 M€ en 2025 […] En 2026, la prévision s’établit à 906 M€ […] La prévision s’établit à 981 M€ pour 2027, soit une hausse de +75 M€ par rapport au révisé 2026. […] L’impôt minimum mondial est entré en vigueur pour les exercices 2024 […] La prévision révisée pour 2026 s’établit à 500 M€ […] Pour 2027, aucun rendement n’est prévu au titre de l’impôt minimum mondial. »
- OCDE, Cadre inclusif sur le BEPS, « Side-by-Side Package » (pages 2, 8 et 84), 2026-01-05: « This document was approved and declassified by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on 5 January 2026 […] When it elects for the safe harbour, an MNE Group will not be subject to the IIR or UTPR. […] The SbS Safe Harbour is applicable for Fiscal Years commencing on or after 1 January 2026 »
- Déclaration du G7 sur l'imposition minimale mondiale, 28 juin 2025 (publiée par le ministère des Finances du Japon), 2025-06-28: « A side-by-side system would fully exclude U.S. parented groups from the UTPR and the IIR in respect of both their domestic and foreign profits. »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
This lever in the method · Costing for Nicolas Dupont-Aignan
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