Business taxation, François Ruffin
Taxation of digital giants and multinationals: Co-signed amendment: GAFAM tax at 6%, 15% above €2bn of global turnover
Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.
The lever. Digital services tax on large platforms, 15% global minimum tax on large groups (European directive), rules against profit shifting to low-tax countries. Direction rule: ↑ heavier taxation of multinationals.
« Le présent amendement propose d’adapter la TSN à la réalité économique actuelle des géants du numérique en instituant une contribution progressive selon la taille mondiale du groupe : – un taux de 6 % applicable à l’ensemble des entreprises aujourd’hui redevables ; – un taux majoré de 15 % pour les groupes dont le chiffre d’affaires consolidé mondial excède 2 milliards d’euros. »1Translation by the editorsThis amendment proposes to adapt the TSN to the current economic reality of the digital giants by instituting a contribution that is progressive according to the global size of the group: – a rate of 6% applicable to all companies currently liable; – an increased rate of 15% for groups whose global consolidated turnover exceeds 2 billion euros.
Words of François Ruffin, Assemblée nationale, amendement n° CF905 au projet de loi de finances pour 2026 (commission des finances, nouvelle lecture), cosigné par François Ruffin (rejeté), 6 January 2026. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme.
Encoding
| Parameter | Current law | Proposed | Effective date or horizon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Digital services tax rate | 3% | 15%* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation) (assumption by the editors, see the costing) | Full year; cost = current yield of the tax (static), PLF 2027 forecast as central value, revised forecast for 2026 as lower bound |
Costing
Announced by the candidate
amount not broken down
Amount announced with no readable annual amount for this position alone: Explanatory statement of the amendment: « elle permettrait d’atteindre un rendement de 2,6 à 2,7 milliards d’euros » [“it would make it possible to reach a yield of €2.6bn to €2.7bn”], compared with « 0,75 à 0,8 milliard d’euros » [“€0.75bn to €0.8bn”] today.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
+€3.6bn* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation)
per year for the public accounts, new revenue, range +€3.6bn to +€3.9bn.
* Outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 3% only).
The calculation
- Digital services tax rate: (15 − 3) ÷ 1 = 12 times “1 point on the digital services tax rate (€981m forecast for 2027 at the 3% rate, divided by 3)”, each a gain of €0.33bn (0.3 to 0.33). Proposed value outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 3% only). Coefficient calculated by the editors from the yield at the observed rate (3%): any other value is a linear extrapolation, flagged as such, which ignores behavioural and threshold effects. Central value brought down to the smallest amount (€0.3bn per step).
Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. Increased rate of 15% (groups whose worldwide turnover exceeds €2bn), applied to all liable companies, as for the 15% amendment co-signed by Gabriel Attal and Olivier Becht; costed at the average yield of one point at the current rate of 3% (coefficient calculated by the editors from the PLF 2027 forecast): linear extrapolation, which ignores the reaction of liable companies. Not modelled: the €2bn threshold and the 6% rate for liable companies that remain below it, whose share of the tax's proceeds is not published; the amount is overestimated accordingly. The authors of the amendment expect from it a total yield of €2.6bn to €2.7bn, i.e. about €1.9bn more than today, much less than this costing.
Coefficient calculated by the editors from PLF 2027, Évaluation des voies et moyens, tome I (pages 24, 25, 29 et 30): the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.
Central value brought down to the smallest amount: amount acknowledged as overestimated, the €2bn threshold and the 6% rate for liable companies that remain below it not being modelled (the authors of the amendment expect about €1.9bn more than today); lower bound of the coefficient: yield of one point according to the revised forecast for 2026 (€906m ÷ 3).
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Digital services tax (created in 2019, code des impositions sur les biens et services, Art. L. 453-45 et seq.): 3% of revenue earned in France from digital intermediation, targeted advertising and the sale of data, for companies whose worldwide turnover exceeds €750m and taxable revenue in France €25m; €902m in 2025, €906m forecast for 2026, €981m in the PLF 2027. 15% global minimum tax (Pillar 2, Directive (EU) 2022/2523, transposed from the Finance Act for 2024): in force for 2024 financial years, first collections in 2026 (€500m forecast), no yield forecast for 2027. Since 5 January 2026, the OECD “side-by-side” regime exempts groups that opt for it, starting with groups with a US parent company, from the IIR and UTPR rules, for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2026.
Horizon. Full year; cost = current yield of the tax (static), PLF 2027 forecast as central value, revised forecast for 2026 as lower bound.
Limits. Earmarked revenue: when the position, in the same sentence, earmarks the tax revenue for a named expenditure, that expenditure is counted at the same amount as the costed revenue (central value), via the parameter “spending financed by the tax revenue”; the revenue and the spending each go into their own total. Abolishing the digital services tax is costed at its revenue. The rate parameter applies the average yield of one point at the current rate (coefficient calculated by the editors: €981m / 3; €906m / 3 as lower bound): an increase to 6% or 15% (proposed by amendment in the National Assembly in autumn 2025 without a revenue assessment; the finance act for 2026 kept 3%) is a linear extrapolation, marked as such, that no administrative source (Voies et moyens, impact assessment, general report) costs. Nor does any source cost the adjustment of multinationals' profits in proportion to the turnover achieved in France (« taxation unitaire », unitary taxation): only estimates by elected officials exist, not counted. The global minimum tax has no forecast yield in 2027: according to the Voies et moyens, countries have changed their tax rules and the exceptional contribution of large companies raises their effective rate; a commitment to apply or strengthen it therefore has no yield that can be costed from this source. The tax's yield varies with the platforms' turnover in France; it is not updated to 2032.
- PLF 2027, Évaluation des voies et moyens, tome I (pages 24, 25, 29 et 30), 2026-10: « Elle s’applique à certaines entreprises du secteur numérique dont le chiffre d’affaires mondial dépasse 750 M€ et dont les recettes taxables en France excèdent 25 M€. […] Son taux est fixé à 3 % et porte sur les recettes générées par ces services en France. […] Les recettes se sont élevées à 902 M€ en 2025 […] En 2026, la prévision s’établit à 906 M€ […] La prévision s’établit à 981 M€ pour 2027, soit une hausse de +75 M€ par rapport au révisé 2026. […] L’impôt minimum mondial est entré en vigueur pour les exercices 2024 […] La prévision révisée pour 2026 s’établit à 500 M€ […] Pour 2027, aucun rendement n’est prévu au titre de l’impôt minimum mondial. »
- OCDE, Cadre inclusif sur le BEPS, « Side-by-Side Package » (pages 2, 8 et 84), 2026-01-05: « This document was approved and declassified by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on 5 January 2026 […] When it elects for the safe harbour, an MNE Group will not be subject to the IIR or UTPR. […] The SbS Safe Harbour is applicable for Fiscal Years commencing on or after 1 January 2026 »
- Déclaration du G7 sur l'imposition minimale mondiale, 28 juin 2025 (publiée par le ministère des Finances du Japon), 2025-06-28: « A side-by-side system would fully exclude U.S. parented groups from the UTPR and the IIR in respect of both their domestic and foreign profits. »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- Assemblée nationale, amendement n° CF905 au projet de loi de finances pour 2026 (commission des finances, nouvelle lecture), cosigné par François Ruffin (rejeté), 6 January 2026. Words of François Ruffin. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme. Read the source (Assemblée nationale, amendement n° CF905 au projet de loi de finances pour 2026 (commission des finances, nouvelle lecture), cosigné par François Ruffin (rejeté)).
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