Institutions, Raphaël Glucksmann
Article 49.3 and revision of the Constitution: Investiture of the Prime Minister and constructive no-confidence vote, end of Article 49.3
Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.
The lever. Article 49.3 (adoption of a law without a vote, unless there is a motion of censure) and other changes to the Constitution, up to a new Republic. Direction rule: ↑ greater executive powers over Parliament.
« Investir le premier ministre par un vote de confiance de l’Assemblée nationale (sur proposition préalable du Président de la République) et instaurer la motion de censure “constructive” (censurer un gouvernement exigera de proposer un successeur), ce qui permettra de mettre fin au 49.3. »1Translation by the editorsInvest the Prime Minister through a vote of confidence of the National Assembly (on prior nomination by the President of the Republic) and introduce the “constructive” motion of no confidence (censuring a government will require proposing a successor), which will make it possible to put an end to Article 49.3.
Place publique, « Acte un – Notre vision pour la France » (codirecteurs de la publication : Aurore Lalucq et Raphaël Glucksmann), 23 June 2025. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme.
No programme released. Positions taken from public statements, words of associates or documents of the candidate’s party, each dated and sourced; last recorded on 21 October 2026.
Encoding
No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The cited source does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
lever that cannot be costed
Lever with no coefficient in the cost schedule: the position is compared, not costed.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Article 49 para. 3 of the Constitution: the Prime Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, make the passing of a text an issue of the Government's responsibility. Since the 2008 revision, this is possible only for finance bills and social security financing bills, plus one other text per session. Revision of the Constitution: article 89, either by referendum or by Congress with a 3/5 majority.
Horizon. Not applicable.
Limits. Procedural lever, with no direct budgetary effect. A revision adopted by referendum costs the price of a vote: see the ric lever (€0.1bn to €0.2bn per vote).
- Constitution, texte en vigueur (Conseil constitutionnel): « Art. 49 al. 3 : « Le Premier ministre peut, après délibération du conseil des ministres, engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement » ; art. 89 al. 3 : « Toutefois, le projet de révision n'est pas présenté au référendum lorsque le Président de la République décide » »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- Place publique, « Acte un – Notre vision pour la France » (codirecteurs de la publication : Aurore Lalucq et Raphaël Glucksmann), 23 June 2025, p. 46. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme. Read the source (Place publique, « Acte un – Notre vision pour la France » (codirecteurs de la publication : Aurore Lalucq et Raphaël Glucksmann)).
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