Déchiffrer 2027

FREN

Income tax and CSG, Raphaël Glucksmann

Income tax scale: Differential contribution on the highest incomes

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Income tax scale: number of brackets, rates, and distribution of the burden between households. Direction rule: ↑ heavier tax.

« renforcer l’équité fiscale en taxant le patrimoine des plus fortunés avec un dispositif d’étalement des paiements pour les biens professionnels ; une contribution différentielle des plus hauts revenus »1

Translation by the editorsstrengthen tax fairness by taxing the wealth of the richest, with a payment-spreading scheme for business assets; a differential contribution from the highest incomes

Place publique, « Budget pour 2026 : un moindre mal qui nous engage à construire une alternative crédible pour la France ! », 3 February 2026. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme.

No programme released. Positions taken from public statements, words of associates or documents of the candidate’s party, each dated and sourced; last recorded on 21 October 2026.

Encoding

The position maintains current law: no parameter changes.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

€0bn

per year for the public accounts, zero cost.

The calculation

  • Status quo: The position maintains current law: zero cost compared with current policies.

« Une contribution différentielle des plus hauts revenus » [“A differential contribution from the highest incomes”] read as the maintenance of the CDHR (minimum tax of 20% on very high incomes, created in the initial finance act for 2025, LFI 2025). The finance act for 2026 extended it « jusqu'à ce que le déficit du budget général soit inférieur à 3 % du produit intérieur brut » [“until the general budget deficit is below 3% of gross domestic product”] (Voies et moyens, PLF 2027, volume I, p. 30, line 1440; €600m expected in 2027): maintaining it is current law, status quo. The text gives no rate or threshold that would strengthen it.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. 2026 scale (2025 income), per share: 0% up to €11,600; 11% from €11,601 to €29,579; 30% from €29,580 to €84,577; 41% from €84,578 to €181,917; 45% above. Brackets uprated by 0.9% by the Finance Act for 2026, promulgated on 19 February 2026; the PLF provided for a freeze. In addition there are the CEHR (3% and 4%) and the CDHR, a minimum tax of 20% of reference taxable income (RFR) above €250,000 (single person) or €500,000 (couple), created in the LFI 2025 and extended by the LFI 2026 « jusqu'à ce que le déficit du budget général soit inférieur à 3 % du produit intérieur brut » [“until the general budget deficit is below 3% of gross domestic product”] (Voies et moyens, PLF 2027, volume I, p. 30, line 1440: €369m in 2025, €790m forecast for 2026, €600m in 2027): its continuation is current law. Yield: €94.9bn of net income tax in 2025, €96.8bn forecast for 2026 and €102.5bn for 2027, including PLF 2027 measures (Voies et moyens, PLF 2027); €104.0bn forecast in the PLF 2026, €99.8bn in the amended état A (January 2026).

Horizon. Full year, in 2026 euros. The base is not brought to 2032 value (of the order of +15 to +20% under a nominal growth assumption, not sourced).

Limits. No official cost schedule has been published for one point of rate per bracket: the breakdown of revenue by bracket is not public (Fipeco: « elle n'est pas possible pour l'IR » [“it is not possible for income tax”]). Costings by bracket (creation of brackets, marginal rate of 50% or more) require a microsimulation (OpenFisca, IPP). Freezing the tax schedule: €1.9bn according to Bercy and the HCFP (Voies et moyens of the PLF 2026), about €1.2bn according to the OFCE (1.1% uprating avoided) and €1.1bn according to the IPP updated in October 2025 (inflation of 1%; €1.4bn in its first estimate, with 1.3%); the gap stems from the inflation assumptions. Lower bound: the lowest figure, that of the updated IPP estimate. Proportional coefficient calculated by the editors: 1% of €94.9bn (2025, lower bound), of €96.8bn (2026, central value) and of €102.5bn (2027, upper bound), according to the Voies et moyens of the PLF 2027. Net income tax includes the 12.8% flat tax (PFU): declared overlap with the income-tax share of the PFU. CDHR (differential contribution on high incomes): the option “extension of the CDHR” (€1.4bn to €1.7bn, one-year extension in the PLF 2026) was withdrawn on 18 October 2026; the 2026 initial finance act (LFI) extended the contribution until the general budget deficit falls below 3% of GDP (Voies et moyens, PLF 2027): maintaining it is status quo; only a strengthening beyond current law (rates, thresholds) would be costed, on the difference, and no source read costs it. Top bracket at 60% above €250,000 per share (option, calculation by the editors, 18 October 2026): the DGFiP (public finances directorate-general) publishes 61,476 households at the 45% marginal rate (family quotient above €180,294) and €12.54bn of net tax (2024 income), with no breakdown above €250,000. With 1.8 shares per household (the top thousandth of RFR per share counts 1.82, the top hundredth 1.73), the average tax per share (€113,300) gives an average taxable income of about €303,600 per share above €180,294 (tax of €57,865 at that threshold, then 45%); a Pareto distribution with the same mean (coefficient 2.46) places 44.7% of these shares above €250,000, with €170,900 on average beyond it: €8.45bn of income above the threshold, and 15 more points yield €1.27bn (centre, rounded to 1.3); 2.0 shares per household give €1.0bn, 1.6 shares €1.6bn. Net tax is taken after tax reductions and credits (which understates income); no behavioural effect, though it is strong at these income levels; capping of the family quotient and CEHR (exceptional contribution on high incomes) ignored. Exemption or reduction of €3,000 for three years after a birth (option, calculation by the editors): the benefit per household is min(tax, €3,000). The DGFiP publishes the average net tax per share and the average number of shares for each tenth of RFR per share (2024 income): about €290 per household in the 6th tenth, €840 in the 7th, €1,640 in the 8th, €3,320 in the 9th and €16,340 in the 10th, nothing below; capped at €3,000, the average of these ten values is €877 per household, which overstates the average benefit (each household being capped, not the average of its tenth). Assuming that the households concerned are distributed like all households, and counting them at most as the children born in three years (643,905 births in 2025, Insee, i.e. 1.93 million over three years), the cost is at most €1.7bn per year. Households of young parents, who are in work, are more often taxable than retirees or students, but have more shares: the distribution assumption may work in either direction.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

  1. Place publique, « Budget pour 2026 : un moindre mal qui nous engage à construire une alternative crédible pour la France ! », 3 February 2026. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme. Read the source (Place publique, « Budget pour 2026 : un moindre mal qui nous engage à construire une alternative crédible pour la France ! »).

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