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Wealth and inheritance, David Lisnard

Wealth tax (IFI, ISF): IFI and transfer duties replaced by property-based taxation

Direction of change: abolition of a scheme, compared with current law.

The lever. Taxation of wealth: real estate wealth tax (IFI), return of a tax on all assets, or a tax on very large fortunes. Direction rule: ↑ heavier taxation of wealth.

« L’IFI et les droits de mutation seraient supprimés et remplacés par une fiscalité foncière assise sur des valeurs vénales actualisées. »1

Translation by the editorsThe IFI and transfer duties would be abolished and replaced by property taxation based on updated market values.

Words of David Lisnard, Tribune « Changer de logiciel fiscal », Atlantico (reprise sur unenouvelleenergie.fr), 16 April 2026. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme.

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Abolition of the IFI (real estate wealth tax) offset by property taxation without a rate: the net balance cannot be costed. Transfer duties fall under local taxation.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. IFI (real estate wealth tax, since 2018): net real estate assets above €1.3m; scale from 0.5% to 1.5% above €0.8m; capped at 75% of income. 194,000 tax assessments in 2025, for €2.3bn in budget accounting (€2.7bn in national accounts); €3.1bn forecast for 2026. The ISF raised €5.1bn in 2017 (358,000 households). The PLF 2026 creates a tax on the financial assets of holding companies (+€1.0bn forecast). No minimum tax on very large fortunes (« taxe Zucman »): the private member's bill adopted by the National Assembly in February 2025 was rejected by the Senate in June 2025.

Horizon. Full year; ISF counterfactual in 2022 euros, not updated for 2032; minimum tax estimated on 2024 fortunes (Challenges ranking), not updated.

Limits. Restoring the wealth tax (ISF): central value, €3.75bn, midpoint of the range of the Conseil d'analyse économique (Council of Economic Analysis, 2025), which puts the revenue loss from abolishing the ISF at between €3bn and €4.5bn, mechanical effect only (lower and upper bounds). Benchmarks: €3.2bn, ex ante revenue loss from converting the ISF into the IFI according to the impact assessment of the PLF 2018 (Senate general report); €4.5bn net from the IFI according to a press summary of the France Stratégie evaluation committee (2022 counterfactual). The 2026 yield of the tax on holding companies depends on the text adopted; the ISF and this tax partly bear on the same assets (declared overlap). Minimum tax of 2% on wealth above €100m (« taxe Zucman »): costed and added at the upper end of the estimates, €15bn to €25bn (about 20, « avec une marge d'erreur d'environ 5 milliards » [“with a margin of error of about 5 billion”] according to Public Sénat), a static estimate by its promoters alone (the economists heard, including Gabriel Zucman), taken up in the reports of the National Assembly (no. 930) and the Senate (no. 689); it is the only static estimate read of the scheme adopted by the National Assembly in February 2025. The administration has not simulated it: the DGFiP stated that it could not do so, for lack of a valuation of financial and business assets. The estimate starts from the Challenges ranking (€1,228bn for the 500 largest fortunes in 2024) and a current tax rate of about 0.3% of wealth. Estimates that take into account exile, optimisation or the deduction of corporate income tax are much lower, €2bn to €5bn: if corporate income tax were deducted, the yield would fall to €2bn or €3bn according to Antoine Levy (cited by the Senate); the figures of about €5bn in circulation take into account exile and optimisation, or this deduction; according to the Senate report, the departure of the three largest fortunes would halve the yield; the Institut de l'entreprise (2026) speaks of a yield « divisé par quatre » [“divided by four”]. CAE Focus no. 118 does not cost this tax (it simulates tax exile for tax increases of €2bn and €4bn). The amount counted is therefore the top of the range, to be read as such. As a differential tax « tous impôts confondus » [“all taxes combined”], it would yield slightly less if the ISF were restored, since the ISF paid on the same assets would be deducted; no source read measures this common share, and the two amounts are added together. A floor limited to billionaires is not costed.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for David Lisnard

  1. Tribune « Changer de logiciel fiscal », Atlantico (reprise sur unenouvelleenergie.fr), 16 April 2026. Words of David Lisnard. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme. Read the source (Tribune « Changer de logiciel fiscal », Atlantico (reprise sur unenouvelleenergie.fr)).

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