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Tax expenditures, subsidies and fraud, Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Public aid to businesses: Make aid to large companies conditional, repayment if breached

Direction of change: change of another kind, or uncertain direction, compared with current law.

The lever. Subsidies, tax credits and exemptions granted to businesses: amount, conditions, commitments in return (jobs, climate, dividends). Direction rule: ↑ more aid.

« Conditionner toute aide d’État aux grandes entreprises à des objectifs sociaux, écologiques et fiscaux contraignants et exiger le remboursement des aides en cas de non respect des contreparties »1

Translation by the editorsMake all State aid to large companies conditional on binding social, environmental and tax objectives, and require repayment of the aid if the conditions attached are not met

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Conditionality of aid: no static cost or gain that can be costed.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. There is no legal definition and no regularly updated official costing. The Senate commission of inquiry (report No. 808, July 2025) estimates aid at « au moins 211 milliards d'euros en 2023 » [“at least 211 billion euros in 2023”] in the broad sense, and at €108bn excluding Bpifrance, reclassified tax expenditures and VAT. The minister at a hearing: €150bn (40 in tax expenditures, 30 in budget spending, 80 in reductions in social contributions). In national accounts terms, non-financial corporations received €73bn in aid in 2024 (Fipeco).

Horizon. Full year; 2023-2025 values.

Limits. The scope is decisive: it makes the amount vary from €73bn to €211bn. The cost schedule uses only one, without overlap: the €30bn of budgetary spending in the minister's breakdown. Reductions in social contributions (€80bn) are costed under the “Reductions in social contributions on low wages” lever, tax expenditures (€40bn) under the “Tax and social security expenditures” lever. Changing the reductions has an effect on employment; static costing does not measure it. Making aid conditional (counterparts) cannot be costed as such. The 10% cut is given by the linear parameter; the abolition of the CIR (research tax credit) is under the « niches-fiscales » lever. Reduction announced as an amount without a list of the aid targeted: a pure amount with no named measure, not costed, cited next to the total (decision 1 of 18 October 2026, common rule), like the cut in production taxes announced as an amount (“Production taxes” lever).

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Jean-Luc Mélenchon

  1. L’Avenir en commun (édition 2025), p. 39. Open the document at this page.

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