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Europe and defence, Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Support for Ukraine: Diplomatic framework: ceasefire, Russian withdrawal, peace negotiations

Direction of change: change of another kind, or uncertain direction, compared with current law.

The lever. Military, financial and diplomatic aid to Ukraine, and position on sanctions against Russia. Direction rule: ↑ greater support.

« En Ukraine, agir pour créer un cadre diplomatique permettant d’obtenir un cessez-le-feu, le retrait des troupes russes, et l’ouverture de négociations pour une paix durable »1

Translation by the editorsIn Ukraine, act to create a diplomatic framework making it possible to obtain a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the opening of negotiations for a lasting peace

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Diplomatic initiative, with no defined budgetary effect: nothing to cost.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. France's military support estimated at €5.9bn from 24 February 2022 to 31 December 2024 (including the €0.4bn bilateral fund), plus the French contribution to the European Peace Facility, up to €2.3bn of which €1.4bn suspended (2025 report to Parliament on arms exports); €6.5bn up to 31 December 2025, EPF included (up to €2.1bn), according to the 2026 report, which changes scope. The total of €8.6bn cited by an amendment (5.9 + 0.4 + 2.3) counts the bilateral fund twice. Annual pace according to the Minister for the Armed Forces: €1.7bn (2022), €2.1bn (2023), « au-dessus de 2 milliards mais en deçà de 3 » [“above 2 billion but below 3”] in 2024. Civilian aid: more than €434m in humanitarian aid at 1 September 2024 (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs), Ukraine Fund of €200m (payment appropriations from 2024 to 2027) then €71m in the finance act for 2026. Franco-Ukrainian bilateral security agreement. EU: €90bn loan for 2026-2027 financed by European borrowing. The interest charge is about €3bn a year for the EU budget from 2028, shared among 24 States, Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia being exempt. For 2028-2034, the Commission proposes a €100bn Ukraine facility outside the ceilings.

Horizon. Full year, current €bn. 2022-2024 values for bilateral aid. The reference law in 2032 depends on the outcome of the conflict.

Limits. A large part of bilateral military aid takes the form of transfers from stocks, funded in the military programming law. Stopping it frees up appropriations only if the defence budget falls by the same amount; otherwise, the budgetary gain is zero. The range for bilateral aid is calculated by the editors: low = 0 (« une grande partie de l'aide à l'Ukraine repose sur les équipements anciens que nous retirons du format des armées grâce à la LPM » [“a large part of the aid to Ukraine relies on old equipment that we are withdrawing from the armed forces' format thanks to the LPM”], according to the minister: without a cut in the defence budget, nothing is saved); central = the civilian share alone, about €0.24bn per year (€434m of humanitarian aid over 2.5 years, i.e. 0.17, plus the Ukraine Fund, €271m over 2024-2027, i.e. 0.07; a combination of two partial sources, as no official source gives a total for civilian aid); high = 2.3, the civilian share plus military aid excluding the FEP (European Peace Facility), €5.9bn over 2.85 years (€2.07bn per year), if military appropriations were also removed from the budget. The former central value (0.95, difference between €8.6bn and €5.9bn) had no basis: this difference is not civilian aid. The former upper bound (€3bn) took up a statement (« plus près de trois » [“closer to three”]) that the official record corrects (« en deçà de 3 » [“below 3”]), and which included about €0.3bn of revenue from frozen Russian assets, paid by the EU. The French share of the interest is a calculation: €3bn × 17.2% to 18% (2024 key, raised because three States are not participating). Commissioner Serafin puts this interest at about €1bn in 2027 and €3bn per year from 2028. The 2028-2034 facility is only a proposal: 100/7 ≈ €14.3bn per year × ~17%. No official assessment of 2025 aid was found. In 2032, the reference law depends on the conflict; cost schedule convention: latest observed level maintained. The French share of the interest on the €90bn European loan is already committed (current law). Option arret-aide-civile-bilaterale: the civilian share alone (€0.24bn per year, same calculation as the central value for ending bilateral aid), for a position that maintains military aid.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Jean-Luc Mélenchon

  1. L’Avenir en commun (édition 2025), p. 61. Open the document at this page.

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