Overseas territories, Jean-Luc Mélenchon
High cost of living overseas: Price and margin controls on essentials
Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.
The lever. Measures against the price gap between the overseas territories and mainland France: price controls, competition, octroi de mer (dock dues). Direction rule: ↑ stronger public intervention on prices.
« Mettre en place un encadrement des prix et des marges sur les produits de première nécessité pour lutter contre la vie chère, les monopoles et les oligopoles privés »1Translation by the editorsIntroduce price and margin controls on essential products to combat the high cost of living, monopolies and private oligopolies
Encoding
Position linked to an option of the cost schedule, with no parameter to set: see the costing.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The programme does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
€0bn
per year for the public accounts, zero cost.
The calculation
- Regulatory measures (caps on margins, quality-price shield, transparency): no direct budgetary cost: Option costed by the source: a cost of €0bn per year.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. The octroi de mer, a tax on imports and local production levied by the authorities of the overseas departments and regions (DROM), raised €1.545bn in 2023 and €1.644bn in 2022 (record). It accounts on average for 32% of the operating revenue of DROM municipalities. Its regime expires at the end of 2027 (European decision) and must be reformed. The bill to combat the high cost of living in the overseas territories (presented on 30 July 2025, adopted by the Senate on 28 October 2025, AN no. 2046) has had its examination postponed and has not been promulgated as of the date of the sources consulted.
Horizon. Full year 2032, current €bn. High = 2023 yield uprated by 2% per year until 2032.
Limits. The effect of abolition on prices is debated: in the illustration in the elected officials' study (AMF), the octroi de mer (dock dues) paid by the importer represents 4.4% of the final price and that paid by the consumer 7.9%; the yield of €1.545bn in 2023 is taken from the press (Banque des Territoires, based on OFGL data), not from that study; an upward effect « plus dur pour les ménages modestes » [“harder on low-income households”] according to the Cour. Compensation by the State is the most costly assumption; replacement by another local tax (regional VAT) would cost the State ~0. The 2024 yield was not found. The range is calculated by the editors: low = 2023, central = 2022-2023 average, high = 2023 × 1.02^9. The fate of the bill after the postponement of February 2026 is not confirmed (legislative file not consulted). The balance is that of general government as a whole: abolishing the octroi de mer costs its yield there, whether or not the State compensates local authorities (compensation is an internal transfer). The “suppression-octroi” option therefore takes the amounts of the compensated option, and is used when the text says nothing about compensation; the two options are mutually exclusive (overlap declared). Same range and same sources: €1.545bn in 2023 (Banque des Territoires), more than €1.6bn in 2022 (Maire-info, Cour des comptes).
- Banque des Territoires, « L'octroi de mer ne contribue que marginalement à la vie chère, selon un rapport » (étude AMF / ACCD'OM), 2025-01-10: « Produit de 1,545 milliard d'euros pour 2023 ; l'octroi de mer « ne représente en moyenne que 4,4 % du prix final » »
- Cour des comptes, « L'octroi de mer, une taxe à la croisée des chemins », mars 2024 (pages 11 et 12 du PDF), 2024-03-05: « Avec des recettes nettes globales atteignant un niveau historique en 2022 (1 644 M€[3]), et une hausse moyenne, tous départements et régions d’outre-mer (DROM) confondus, de 4,64 % par an sur la période 2014-2022 […] L’octroi de mer représente en moyenne 32 % des produits de gestion des communes des départements et régions d’outre-mer, avec des écarts importants entre elles. »
- AMF et ACCD'OM (Action publique conseil), « Analyse du mécanisme de la chaîne de constitution des prix en Outre-mer », rapport final, janvier 2025 (page 27), 2025-01-09: « ▪ l’OME effectivement payé par l’importateur à l’arrivée représente 4,4 % du prix final. ▪ l’OME effectivement payé par le consommateur est nettement plus important et représente 7,9 % du prix final. »
- Assemblée nationale, projet de loi de lutte contre la vie chère dans les outre-mer, n° 2046, 2025-10-29: « Enregistré à la Présidence de l'Assemblée nationale le 29 octobre 2025 (texte adopté par le Sénat) »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- L’Avenir en commun, édition 2025 (La France insoumise), version 1 of 28 January 2025, p. 29. Open the document at this page.
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