Local authorities, François Ruffin
Local taxation: Housing tax on second homes made progressive according to income
Direction of change: change of another kind, or uncertain direction, compared with current law.
The lever. Local authorities' own resources: residence tax (taxe d'habitation), share of national taxes allocated, freedom to set rates. Direction rule: ↑ greater tax-raising powers for local authorities or higher local taxes.
« Enfin, pour que la taxe d’habitation sur les résidences secondaires devienne plus juste et efficace, nous proposons de la rendre progressive selon les revenus. »1Translation by the editorsFinally, so that the housing tax on second homes becomes fairer and more effective, we propose to make it progressive according to income.
Encoding
No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The programme does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
not costed
Progressive scale with no rates or thresholds: nothing to cost.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Compulsory levies of local government: €190bn in 2025. Residence tax (taxe d'habitation) on main residences abolished since 2023, offset by the transfer of the départements' TFPB to municipalities and by fractions of VAT. Remaining: TH on second homes (€3.1bn, rate set freely); TFPB (€43.1bn); CFE; DMTO (€17.7bn in 2025); transferred fraction of VAT (€53bn).
Horizon. Local revenue; impact on the overall general government balance, neutralised if the measure merely transfers between the State and local authorities.
Limits. The TH (housing tax) figures date from 2017 to 2021 (€22.2bn received by local authorities; €19.3bn paid by households) and are not updated. Some local reforms are merely transfers, with a zero balance for general government as a whole: treated as such. Exception (option of 18 October 2026): a State payment to communes earmarked for new spending (public facilities) is counted as a grant, at the cost to the State, as in the local authority grants lever: €9,000 × 274,611 housing starts in 2025 (SDES, seasonally adjusted cumulative total) = €2.47bn per year, at the 2025 construction rate (editors' calculation; 379,222 dwellings authorised in the same year).
- Fipeco, Les impôts locaux, 2026-06-24: « Les prélèvements obligatoires affectés aux administrations publiques locales se sont élevées ... à 190 Md€ en 2025 ... Son produit s'est élevé à 22,2 Md€ pour les collectivités locales en 2017 ... les ménages n'ont payé que 19,3 Md€ ... Les droits de mutation à titre onéreux (DMTO) ont rapporté 17,7 Md€ en 2025 »
- Fipeco, Les recettes des administrations publiques locales, 2026-07-06: « la TVA transférée (53 Md€) »
- SDES, Construction de logements : résultats à fin décembre 2025 (France entière), 2026-01: « Sur toute l'année 2025, 379 222 logements ont été autorisés à la construction, soit 15,0 % de plus que sur l'année 2024 mais 8,8 % de moins que la moyenne des cinq années précédentes. […] Sur toute l'année 2025, 274 611 logements ont été mis en chantier, soit 21,3 % de moins que la moyenne des cinq années précédentes. »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- Cahier « Face à la crise du logement : faire sauter le verrou ». Read the programme page.
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