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Business taxation, Marine Tondelier

Windfall profits and share buybacks: Windfall tax on oil and gas and shipping superprofits

Direction of change: creation of a scheme, compared with current law.

The lever. Taxation of the exceptional profits of certain companies and of companies' buybacks of their own shares. Direction rule: ↑ heavier taxation.

« Adopter une taxe exceptionnelle sur les superprofits de l’industrie pétrogazière et du commerce maritime. »1

Translation by the editorsAdopt an exceptional tax on the superprofits of the oil and gas industry and of maritime trade.

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Tax with no rate and no definition of excess profit: nothing to cost.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Exceptional contribution on the profits of large companies (turnover > €1bn): €8bn forecast for 2025 and €7.5bn collected. Renewed in the LFI 2026 at a reduced level: €4bn in the PLF, €6bn according to the Senate, €7.3bn according to the OFCE. Tax on share buybacks (LFI 2025): €0.4bn in 2025, €0.2bn per year on a permanent basis.

Horizon. Full year; the surcharge is not in the law beyond 2026: making it permanent is a gain compared with current policies.

Limits. 2026 yield of the renewal: three sources diverge (€4bn / €6bn / €7.3bn). A « taxe sur les superprofits » (superprofits tax) on excess profit relative to an average requires a precise definition. No generic official costing. The tax on share buybacks is already in force. Tax on share buybacks at 33% (option, editors' calculation, 18 October 2026): the tax in force (8%, consolidated turnover above €1bn) raises €200m per year at steady state; at 33% on the same base, 0.2 × 33 / 8 = €0.83bn, i.e. €0.63bn more. A 33% rate would discourage buybacks: static costing, upper limit; extending the base to the acquisition value of the shares and to companies with turnover above €750m has no published base. 4% tax on dividends paid (option, editors' calculation, 18 October 2026): the 3% contribution on amounts distributed « a rapporté à l'État 1,8 milliard d'euros par an entre 2013 et 2017 » [“brought the State 1.8 billion euros per year between 2013 and 2017”] (question to the Government by Charles de Courson, National Assembly); at 4%, 1.8 × 4 / 3 = €2.4bn. Two biases in opposite directions: companies distributing less than €10m would pay 2% (counted as less), while SMEs exempt from the former contribution and the rise in dividends since 2017 are not counted (more). The 3% scheme was struck down (Conseil constitutionnel, 6 October 2017) and refunded (about €10bn); the legal compliance of a new tax is not assessed, as elsewhere in the cost schedule.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Marine Tondelier

  1. Pour une prospérité écologique, programme des Écologistes, p. 66. Open the document at this page.

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