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Business taxation, Marine Le Pen

Windfall profits and share buybacks: Tax on share buybacks, €8.4bn expected (RN counter-budget)

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Taxation of the exceptional profits of certain companies and of companies' buybacks of their own shares. Direction rule: ↑ heavier taxation.

« Taxe sur les rachats d'action »1

Translation by the editorsTax on share buybacks

Rassemblement national, contre-budget 2026 (base PLF 2026), conférence de presse du 23 octobre 2025, 23 October 2025. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme.

No programme released. Positions taken from public statements, words of associates or documents of the candidate’s party, each dated and sourced; last recorded on 18 October 2026.

Encoding

Position linked to an option of the cost schedule, with no parameter to set: see the costing.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

+€8.4bn

per year, new revenue. €8.4bn (RN 2026 counter-budget, line « Taxe sur les rachats d'action » [“Tax on share buybacks”])

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

+€0.6bn

per year for the public accounts, new revenue.

The calculation

  • Tax on capital reductions through share buybacks raised from 8% to 33%, on the current base (permanent yield of €200m at 8%, Voies et moyens), gain net of the current yield, static (editors' calculation): Option costed by the source: a gain of €0.63bn per year.

Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. Reading: the line « Taxe sur les rachats d'action » [“Tax on share buybacks”] in the counter-budget (€8.4bn) corresponds to amendment No. I-105 of the RN group to the PLF 2026 (17 October 2025, adopted), which expects « 8,415 milliards d'euros la première année » [“8.415 billion euros in the first year”] from it: rate raised from 8% to 33%, base extended to the acquisition value of the shares, threshold lowered from €1bn to €750m of turnover. Costed: the 33% rate on the current base, which yields €200m a year at 8% on a permanent basis, i.e. €0.63bn more (static; such a high rate would discourage buybacks, which the amendment itself aims at). Not costed: the widening of the base and of the scope, with no public base (the €25.5bn of buybacks in 2025 in the amendment's explanatory statement are not sourced). The same counter-budget separately enters a « Taxe sur les superdividendes » [“Tax on super-dividends”] (€0.75bn).

Coefficient calculated by the editors from PLF 2026, Voies et moyens tome I: the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.

Figure announced by the candidate: no gap calculated: costing based on an assumption by the editors.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Exceptional contribution on the profits of large companies (turnover > €1bn): €8bn forecast for 2025 and €7.5bn collected. Renewed in the LFI 2026 at a reduced level: €4bn in the PLF, €6bn according to the Senate, €7.3bn according to the OFCE. Tax on share buybacks (LFI 2025): €0.4bn in 2025, €0.2bn per year on a permanent basis.

Horizon. Full year; the surcharge is not in the law beyond 2026: making it permanent is a gain compared with current policies.

Limits. 2026 yield of the renewal: three sources diverge (€4bn / €6bn / €7.3bn). A « taxe sur les superprofits » (superprofits tax) on excess profit relative to an average requires a precise definition. No generic official costing. The tax on share buybacks is already in force. Tax on share buybacks at 33% (option, editors' calculation, 18 October 2026): the tax in force (8%, consolidated turnover above €1bn) raises €200m per year at steady state; at 33% on the same base, 0.2 × 33 / 8 = €0.83bn, i.e. €0.63bn more. A 33% rate would discourage buybacks: static costing, upper limit; extending the base to the acquisition value of the shares and to companies with turnover above €750m has no published base. 4% tax on dividends paid (option, editors' calculation, 18 October 2026): the 3% contribution on amounts distributed « a rapporté à l'État 1,8 milliard d'euros par an entre 2013 et 2017 » [“brought the State 1.8 billion euros per year between 2013 and 2017”] (question to the Government by Charles de Courson, National Assembly); at 4%, 1.8 × 4 / 3 = €2.4bn. Two biases in opposite directions: companies distributing less than €10m would pay 2% (counted as less), while SMEs exempt from the former contribution and the rise in dividends since 2017 are not counted (more). The 3% scheme was struck down (Conseil constitutionnel, 6 October 2017) and refunded (about €10bn); the legal compliance of a new tax is not assessed, as elsewhere in the cost schedule.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Marine Le Pen

  1. Rassemblement national, contre-budget 2026 (base PLF 2026), conférence de presse du 23 octobre 2025, 23 October 2025, p. 7. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme. Read the source (Rassemblement national, contre-budget 2026 (base PLF 2026), conférence de presse du 23 octobre 2025).

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