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Income tax and CSG, Raphaël Glucksmann

Flat-rate levy on capital (flat tax): PFU raised to 34%, end of the wiping out of unrealised capital gains

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Single rate applied to dividends, interest and capital gains on securities, tax and social levies included: maintained, increased or return to the income tax scale. Direction rule: ↑ heavier levy on capital income.

« instaurer une fiscalité plus juste des revenus financiers avec une hausse du Prélèvement forfaitaire unique de 30 à 34% et la fin de l’effacement des plus-values latentes afin de rapprocher la fiscalité du capital de celle du travail. »1

Translation by the editorsintroduce fairer taxation of financial income with an increase in the flat tax (Prélèvement forfaitaire unique) from 30 to 34% and an end to the wiping out of unrealised capital gains, in order to bring the taxation of capital closer to that of labour.

Place publique, « Budget pour 2026 : un moindre mal qui nous engage à construire une alternative crédible pour la France ! », 3 February 2026. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme.

No programme released. Positions taken from public statements, words of associates or documents of the candidate’s party, each dated and sourced; last recorded on 21 October 2026.

Encoding

ParameterCurrent lawProposedEffective date or horizon
Income tax component of the flat tax (PFU)12.8%15.4%* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation) (assumption by the editors, see the costing)Full year, in 2025 euros; to be indexed for 2032

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

+€1.1bn* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation)

per year for the public accounts, new revenue, range +€0.9bn to +€1.1bn.

* Outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 12.8% only).

The calculation

  • Income tax component of the flat tax (PFU): (15.4 − 12.8) ÷ 1 = 2.6 times “1 point increase in the income tax component of the PFU (12.8% to 13.8%), static (derived: €5.3bn / 12.8)”, each a gain of €0.41bn (0.35 to 0.41). Proposed value outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 12.8% only). Coefficient calculated by the editors from the yield at the current rate (12.8%): any other value is a linear extrapolation, flagged as such.

Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. The text says « de 30 à 34 % » [“from 30 to 34%”]; the PFU has stood at 31.4% since the LFSS 2026. Reading adopted: total PFU at 34% via the income tax component (12.8 → 15.4%), social levies unchanged. The end of the wiping out of unrealised capital gains is not costed here. The Projet socialiste (25 June 2026) abolishes the PFU; this Parti socialiste text, which no statement by the candidate takes up, is not retained as his position.

Coefficient calculated by the editors from Sénat, rapport général n° 108 (2017-2018) sur le PLF 2018, tome II, examen de l'article 11 (prélèvement forfaitaire unique): the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Flat tax (PFU) of 31.4% since the LFSS 2026: 12.8% income tax and 18.6% social levies (CSG raised to 10.6% for most securities). It was 30% (12.8 + 17.2) from 2018 to 2025. The option for the income tax scale remains open. 2025 yield: €5.3bn of income tax on income and capital gains from securities; €18.5bn of CSG and CRDS on capital income; €14.4bn of other social contributions.

Horizon. Full year, in 2025 euros; to be indexed for 2032.

Limits. Capital income is highly sensitive to taxation: dividends jumped after 2018. Static costing therefore overstates the gain from an increase; behavioural effects are presented separately. The cost of €1.9bn of the PFU in 2019 (€1.3bn in 2018) is the Government's costing, assuming unchanged behaviour, reported by the Senate (general report on the PLF 2018); the same report cites economists' estimates of « une dizaine de milliards » [“around ten billion”] in steady state, not static and not counted. Upper bound: the Institut Montaigne (2022) costs the return to the income tax schedule at €2.1bn to €2.3bn « à assiette constante » [“on a constant base”] (ex ante cost of the PFU of €1.6bn to €1.8bn, updated with the growth in capital income from 2018 to 2022, in 2022 euros), and at €1.5bn with behavioural effects (not counted). Per-point calculations divide the revenue by the rate, without microsimulation.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Raphaël Glucksmann

  1. Place publique, « Budget pour 2026 : un moindre mal qui nous engage à construire une alternative crédible pour la France ! », 3 February 2026. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme. Read the source (Place publique, « Budget pour 2026 : un moindre mal qui nous engage à construire une alternative crédible pour la France ! »).

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