Déchiffrer 2027

FREN

Income tax and CSG, Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Flat-rate levy on capital (flat tax): Abolish the flat tax, tax capital like labour

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Single rate applied to dividends, interest and capital gains on securities, tax and social levies included: maintained, increased or return to the income tax scale. Direction rule: ↑ heavier levy on capital income.

« Supprimer la flat tax et imposer les revenus du capital comme ceux du travail »1

Translation by the editorsAbolish the flat tax and tax income from capital like income from labour

Encoding

Position linked to an option of the cost schedule, with no parameter to set: see the costing.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

+€9bn

per year, new revenue. Éric Coquerel, press conference of 14 October 2026 (around 0:49:07): « Ça commence par évidemment la suppression de la flat tax, qui est le bouclier social du capital. C'est 9 milliards d'euros. » [“It starts, obviously, with the abolition of the flat tax, which is the social shield of capital. That is 9 billion euros.”]

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

+€1.9bn

per year for the public accounts, new revenue, range +€1bn to +€2.3bn.

The calculation

  • Return to the income tax schedule (end of the PFU): cost of the PFU estimated by the Government assuming unchanged behaviour (€1.9bn in 2019); upper bound, static costing by the Institut Montaigne (2022): Option costed by the source: a gain of €1.9bn (1 to 2.3) per year.

Figure announced by the candidate: no gap calculated: the announcement covers a different scope or a different year.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Flat tax (PFU) of 31.4% since the LFSS 2026: 12.8% income tax and 18.6% social levies (CSG raised to 10.6% for most securities). It was 30% (12.8 + 17.2) from 2018 to 2025. The option for the income tax scale remains open. 2025 yield: €5.3bn of income tax on income and capital gains from securities; €18.5bn of CSG and CRDS on capital income; €14.4bn of other social contributions.

Horizon. Full year, in 2025 euros; to be indexed for 2032.

Limits. Capital income is highly sensitive to taxation: dividends jumped after 2018. Static costing therefore overstates the gain from an increase; behavioural effects are presented separately. The cost of €1.9bn of the PFU in 2019 (€1.3bn in 2018) is the Government's costing, assuming unchanged behaviour, reported by the Senate (general report on the PLF 2018); the same report cites economists' estimates of « une dizaine de milliards » [“around ten billion”] in steady state, not static and not counted. Upper bound: the Institut Montaigne (2022) costs the return to the income tax schedule at €2.1bn to €2.3bn « à assiette constante » [“on a constant base”] (ex ante cost of the PFU of €1.6bn to €1.8bn, updated with the growth in capital income from 2018 to 2022, in 2022 euros), and at €1.5bn with behavioural effects (not counted). Per-point calculations divide the revenue by the rate, without microsimulation.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

  1. L’Avenir en commun (édition 2025), p. 27. Open the document at this page.

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