Income tax and CSG, David Lisnard
CSG (general social contribution): CSG on earned income lowered, CSG and CRDS deductible from income tax
Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.
The lever. General social contribution (CSG), levied on almost all income: rate, progressivity, possible merger with income tax. Direction rule: ↑ heavier CSG.
« La CSG sur les revenus d’activité serait abaissée, avec un gain immédiatement lisible sur chaque fiche de paie. CSG et CRDS deviendraient complètement déductibles de l’IR, mettant fin à l’« impôt sur l’impôt ». »1Translation by the editorsCSG on earned income would be lowered, with an immediately visible gain on every payslip. CSG and CRDS would become fully deductible from income tax, putting an end to the “tax on tax”.
Words of David Lisnard, Tribune « Changer de logiciel fiscal », Atlantico (reprise sur unenouvelleenergie.fr), 16 April 2026. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme.
Encoding
Position linked to an option of the cost schedule, with no parameter to set: see the costing.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The cited source does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
−€5.6bn
per year for the public accounts, revenue cut, range −€5.8bn to −€5.5bn.
The calculation
- CSG and CRDS fully deductible from taxable income (earned and replacement income): income tax lost, static (editors' calculation): Option costed by the source: a cost of €5.6bn (5.5 to 5.8) per year.
Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. Reading: « CSG et CRDS deviendraient complètement déductibles de l'IR » [“CSG and CRDS would become fully deductible from income tax”] applies to all CSG and CRDS levied on income taxed under the scale, earned income and replacement income (2.4 non-deductible points of CSG and 0.5 point of CRDS); on earned income alone, about €4.4bn. Tax lost calculated by the editors at the 12.5% rate measured by the IPP on the deductible part of retirees' CSG. The cut in the CSG on earned income, with no rate or amount, is not costed; it may be part of the €120bn « rendus aux actifs » [“returned to working people”] of the contribution relief lever, whose composition is not detailed.
Coefficient calculated by the editors from Commission des comptes de la sécurité sociale, octobre 2026, fiche 1.3, tableau 6: the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. CSG at 9.2% on earned income (1.75% allowance for expenses). On pensions: 0%, 3.8%, 6.6% or 8.3% depending on the RFR (reference taxable income). On capital income, the LFSS 2026 raises the rate from 9.2% to 10.6% for part of financial savings income; it remains at 9.2% for property income, real estate capital gains and life insurance. 6.8 points are deductible from income tax. In addition there is the CRDS at 0.5%. Yield: €157bn in 2025 (Fipeco), €153.8bn in 2024 (CCSS).
Horizon. Full year, in 2025 euros. The base is not brought to 2032 value (of the order of +15 to +20% under a nominal growth assumption).
Limits. The figure of €18bn per point comes from Fipeco based on CCSS data (2025 yield): it is a gross yield. A CSG increase falls largely on the deductible portion and reduces income tax: the IPP measures this effect at €0.6bn out of €4.8bn gross for retirees' CSG (12.5%). The IPP measures this 12.5% rate on an increase falling entirely on the deductible portion (note no. 129: rates of 6.6% and 8.3% raised to 9.2%, « avec la même part déductible (6,8 points) » [“with the same deductible portion (6.8 points)”]): the correction applies only to the deductible portion of the levy. Cost schedule rule (central = net): for one point added to all rates, assumed deductible like the 2018 increase, 18 × (1 − 0.125) = €15.75bn net per point, 18 as upper bound; this calculation also applies the correction to the share of the capital base subject to the flat-rate levy, where CSG is not deductible (about €2bn per point, 18 / 9.2): it understates the gain by at most €0.25bn per point. For an average point of CSG on earned income, of which 6.8 points out of 9.2 are deductible: 12.1 × (1 − 0.125 × 6.8 / 9.2) = €11.0bn net (editors' calculation). Calculations by base divide the revenue by 9.2%; for replacement income, taxed at lower rates, this calculation (28 / 9.2 = €3.0bn per point) underestimated the base: the CCSS publishes the value of one point, €3.90bn in 2025 (4.04 forecast for 2026), used since 18 October 2026 (parameter “replacement income”; net at the centre: 3.9 × (1 − 0.125) = €3.41bn, editors' calculation, the increase being assumed deductible like that of 2018). The same table publishes €12.03bn per point on earned income (the cost schedule keeps 111 / 9.2 = 12.1, a negligible difference) and 1.91 on capital. Aligning retirees' CSG with that of people in work also falls within the pensions domain: a microsimulation by RFR (reference taxable income) band would be needed. LFSS 2026 measure on capital: €1.2bn according to the Senate, €0.1bn in 2026 then €1.4bn in 2027 according to the government (press figure). The 1.4-point increase on part of financial savings (LFSS 2026) is already in force. CSG rate on earned income (parameter): coefficient calculated by the editors from the 2025 revenue (€111bn ÷ 9.2 = €12.1bn gross per point, 11.0 net of income tax at the centre), as for the digital services tax; any value other than 9.2% is a linear extrapolation, marked as such. The option “+1 point on earned income only” is worth one step. Abolition of CSG on earned income: costed at its 2025 revenue (€111bn, Fipeco based on the CCSS), like other tax abolitions; this gross revenue goes to the upper bound; at the centre, net of the income tax that the disappearance of the deductible portion would generate, the 12.5% correction applying only to that portion (6.8 points out of 9.2): 111 × (1 − 0.125 × 6.8 / 9.2) = €100.7bn (editors' calculation; 97.1 before 18 October 2026, when the correction applied to all 9.2 points). Static costing: no effect on employment and no feedback from VAT or contributions. CSG and CRDS fully deductible (option, 18 October 2026, editors' calculation): the non-deductible portion is 2.4 points at each rate (9.2%, of which 6.8 deductible, on earned income; 8.3 of which 5.9, 6.6 of which 4.2 and 6.2 of which 3.8 on replacement income; the reduced rate of 3.8% is fully deductible), and the CRDS (0.5%) is not deductible. Additional deductions: earned income, (2.4 + 0.5) × 12.03 = €34.9bn (value of the point published by the CCSS); replacement income, 2.4 × 3.9 × s + 0.5 × 3.9, where s is the share of the base excluding the reduced rate, not published, taken between 0.75 and 1 (€9.0bn to €11.3bn). The lost tax applies to these deductions the 12.5% rate that the IPP measures for the deductible portion of retirees' CSG (the only one read, which the cost schedule also applies to earned income): 4.36 + 1.12 = €5.5bn (lower bound), 5.6 at the centre (s = 0.875), 5.8 (upper bound). Capital income taxed at the flat rate (without deduction) and property income not counted. The average tax rate on deductions on earned income may differ from 12.5%: no source read measures it.
- Fipeco, L'impôt sur le revenu et la CSG, 2026-06-01: « Le produit de la CSG était de 157 Md€ en 2025 ... Une hausse d'un point de l'ensemble des taux de la CSG aurait rapporté 18 Md€ en 2025. [Tableau] Revenus d'activité 111 ; Revenus de remplacement 28 ; Revenus du capital 18 ; Autres 1 »
- Sénat, avis n° 747 (2025-2026), recettes de la sécurité sociale, 2026: « relever le taux de CSG de 9,2 % à 10,6 % pour une partie des produits d'épargne financière ... rendement estimé à 1,2 milliard d'euros »
- Commission des comptes de la sécurité sociale, octobre 2026, fiche 1.3, tableau 6, 2026-10: « Tableau 6 ● Valeur de point de la CSG par assiette (en millions d'euros) : CSG totale 2024 17 550 ; 2025 17 940 ; 2026 (p) 17 780 ; 2027 (p) 18 420 […] Activité : 2024 11 760 ; 2025 12 030 ; 2026 (p) 11 740 ; 2027 (p) 12 160 […] Remplacement : 2024 3 770 ; 2025 3 900 ; 2026 (p) 4 040 ; 2027 (p) 4 200 […] Note de lecture : la valeur de point correspond, pour chaque assiette et chaque taux, au rapport du rendement de la CSG et du taux facial. »
- Commission des comptes de la sécurité sociale, octobre 2026, fiche 1.3, tableau 1 (rendement de la CSG par assiette), 2026-10: « Tableau 1 : CSG brute 2024 153 800 ; 2025 157 207 ; 2026 (p) 156 087 ; 2027 (p) 162 329 […] CSG sur les revenus d'activité : 2024 108 175 (3,3 %) ; 2025 110 670 (2,3 %) […] CSG sur les revenus de remplacement : 2024 27 353 (4,6 %) ; 2025 28 259 (3,3 %) ; 2026 (p) 29 370 (3,9 %) ; 2027 (p) 30 555 (4,0 %) »
- IPP, Note n° 129, Comment mettre à contribution les retraités pour le redressement des finances publiques ?, 2026-09: « Les revenus d’activité supportent une CSG de 9,2 % (dont 6,8 points déductibles du revenu imposable). […] porter à 9,2 % les taux de 6,6 % et 8,3 % rapporterait 4,2 Mde. Là encore, un effet de second tour réduit le produit de la mesure d’environ 0,6 Mde »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- Tribune « Changer de logiciel fiscal », Atlantico (reprise sur unenouvelleenergie.fr), 16 April 2026. Words of David Lisnard. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme. Read the source (Tribune « Changer de logiciel fiscal », Atlantico (reprise sur unenouvelleenergie.fr)).
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