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Income tax and CSG, Raphaël Glucksmann

CSG (general social contribution): Lower the CSG on wages, funded by large inheritances

Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.

The lever. General social contribution (CSG), levied on almost all income: rate, progressivity, possible merger with income tax. Direction rule: ↑ heavier CSG.

« J'ai fait une proposition forte qui est de dire on baisse la CSG sur les salaires pour les salariés et on trouve l'argent où? Eh bien chez les grands, les méga-héritiers »1

Translation by the editorsI made a strong proposal, which is to say we lower the CSG on wages for employees, and where do we find the money? Well, from the big ones, the mega-heirs

Words of Raphaël Glucksmann, AFP (reprise par TradingView), débat des candidats devant le Medef (LCI), 27 August 2026. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme.

No programme released. Positions taken from public statements, words of associates or documents of the candidate’s party, each dated and sourced; last recorded on 21 October 2026.

Encoding

ParameterCurrent lawProposedEffective date or horizon
CSG rate on earned income9.2%7.96%* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation) (assumption by the editors, see the costing)Full year, in 2025 euros

Costing

Announced by the candidate

−€15bn

per year, revenue cut. Public Sénat, 24 August 2026: « Cela nous permettra de récupérer 15 milliards d’euros et de les transférer directement sur la fiche de paie des travailleurs français. » [“This will allow us to recover 15 billion euros and transfer them directly onto French workers’ payslips.”]

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

−€14bn* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation)

per year for the public accounts, revenue cut, range −€15bn to −€14bn.

* Outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 9.2% only).

The calculation

  • CSG rate on earned income: (7.96 − 9.2) ÷ 1 = -1.24 times “1 point of CSG on earned income only (2025 yield, €111bn at the 9.2% rate, divided by 9.2; central value net of the income tax due on the deductible portion, 6.8 points out of 9.2)”, each a gain of €11bn (11 to 12.1). Proposed value outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 9.2% only). Coefficient calculated by the editors from the yield at the observed rate (9.2%): any other value is a linear extrapolation, flagged as such, which ignores behavioural effects.

Assumption by the editors. The €15bn that the candidate wants to pay back « sur la fiche de paie » [“onto the payslip”] is read as the gross yield of the decrease in the CSG on earned income: 15 ÷ €12.1bn per point (gross yield of one point, coefficient calculated by the editors) ≈ 1.24 points, i.e. a rate brought down from 9.2% to 7.96%: editors’ hypothesis. Central value, net of the income tax due to the deductible part (€11bn per point): about €13.6bn; €15bn gross as the upper bound. The funding announced in the same sentence, the taxation of the largest inheritances (€15bn announced, with no rate or schedule), cannot be costed: it is displayed under the inheritance tax lever as an announced amount, not added. Rule common to all: a costable measure is counted; funding that is not costable (revenue with no rate or schedule, undetailed overall savings) is cited, not added.

Coefficient calculated by the editors from Fipeco, L'impôt sur le revenu et la CSG: the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.

Figure announced by the candidate: no gap calculated: costing based on an assumption by the editors.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. CSG at 9.2% on earned income (1.75% allowance for expenses). On pensions: 0%, 3.8%, 6.6% or 8.3% depending on the RFR (reference taxable income). On capital income, the LFSS 2026 raises the rate from 9.2% to 10.6% for part of financial savings income; it remains at 9.2% for property income, real estate capital gains and life insurance. 6.8 points are deductible from income tax. In addition there is the CRDS at 0.5%. Yield: €157bn in 2025 (Fipeco), €153.8bn in 2024 (CCSS).

Horizon. Full year, in 2025 euros. The base is not brought to 2032 value (of the order of +15 to +20% under a nominal growth assumption).

Limits. The figure of €18bn per point comes from Fipeco based on CCSS data (2025 yield): it is a gross yield. A CSG increase falls largely on the deductible portion and reduces income tax: the IPP measures this effect at €0.6bn out of €4.8bn gross for retirees' CSG (12.5%). The IPP measures this 12.5% rate on an increase falling entirely on the deductible portion (note no. 129: rates of 6.6% and 8.3% raised to 9.2%, « avec la même part déductible (6,8 points) » [“with the same deductible portion (6.8 points)”]): the correction applies only to the deductible portion of the levy. Cost schedule rule (central = net): for one point added to all rates, assumed deductible like the 2018 increase, 18 × (1 − 0.125) = €15.75bn net per point, 18 as upper bound; this calculation also applies the correction to the share of the capital base subject to the flat-rate levy, where CSG is not deductible (about €2bn per point, 18 / 9.2): it understates the gain by at most €0.25bn per point. For an average point of CSG on earned income, of which 6.8 points out of 9.2 are deductible: 12.1 × (1 − 0.125 × 6.8 / 9.2) = €11.0bn net (editors' calculation). Calculations by base divide the revenue by 9.2%; for replacement income, taxed at lower rates, this calculation (28 / 9.2 = €3.0bn per point) underestimated the base: the CCSS publishes the value of one point, €3.90bn in 2025 (4.04 forecast for 2026), used since 18 October 2026 (parameter “replacement income”; net at the centre: 3.9 × (1 − 0.125) = €3.41bn, editors' calculation, the increase being assumed deductible like that of 2018). The same table publishes €12.03bn per point on earned income (the cost schedule keeps 111 / 9.2 = 12.1, a negligible difference) and 1.91 on capital. Aligning retirees' CSG with that of people in work also falls within the pensions domain: a microsimulation by RFR (reference taxable income) band would be needed. LFSS 2026 measure on capital: €1.2bn according to the Senate, €0.1bn in 2026 then €1.4bn in 2027 according to the government (press figure). The 1.4-point increase on part of financial savings (LFSS 2026) is already in force. CSG rate on earned income (parameter): coefficient calculated by the editors from the 2025 revenue (€111bn ÷ 9.2 = €12.1bn gross per point, 11.0 net of income tax at the centre), as for the digital services tax; any value other than 9.2% is a linear extrapolation, marked as such. The option “+1 point on earned income only” is worth one step. Abolition of CSG on earned income: costed at its 2025 revenue (€111bn, Fipeco based on the CCSS), like other tax abolitions; this gross revenue goes to the upper bound; at the centre, net of the income tax that the disappearance of the deductible portion would generate, the 12.5% correction applying only to that portion (6.8 points out of 9.2): 111 × (1 − 0.125 × 6.8 / 9.2) = €100.7bn (editors' calculation; 97.1 before 18 October 2026, when the correction applied to all 9.2 points). Static costing: no effect on employment and no feedback from VAT or contributions. CSG and CRDS fully deductible (option, 18 October 2026, editors' calculation): the non-deductible portion is 2.4 points at each rate (9.2%, of which 6.8 deductible, on earned income; 8.3 of which 5.9, 6.6 of which 4.2 and 6.2 of which 3.8 on replacement income; the reduced rate of 3.8% is fully deductible), and the CRDS (0.5%) is not deductible. Additional deductions: earned income, (2.4 + 0.5) × 12.03 = €34.9bn (value of the point published by the CCSS); replacement income, 2.4 × 3.9 × s + 0.5 × 3.9, where s is the share of the base excluding the reduced rate, not published, taken between 0.75 and 1 (€9.0bn to €11.3bn). The lost tax applies to these deductions the 12.5% rate that the IPP measures for the deductible portion of retirees' CSG (the only one read, which the cost schedule also applies to earned income): 4.36 + 1.12 = €5.5bn (lower bound), 5.6 at the centre (s = 0.875), 5.8 (upper bound). Capital income taxed at the flat rate (without deduction) and property income not counted. The average tax rate on deductions on earned income may differ from 12.5%: no source read measures it.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Raphaël Glucksmann

  1. AFP (reprise par TradingView), débat des candidats devant le Medef (LCI), 27 August 2026. Words of Raphaël Glucksmann. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme. Read the source (AFP (reprise par TradingView), débat des candidats devant le Medef (LCI)).

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