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Income tax and CSG, Marine Tondelier

CSG (general social contribution): CSG made progressive and raised by one point for health insurance

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. General social contribution (CSG), levied on almost all income: rate, progressivity, possible merger with income tax. Direction rule: ↑ heavier CSG.

« Supprimer le déficit de l’assurance-maladie sans pénaliser ni les soignant·es ni les malades en rendant progressive la Contribution Sociale Généralisée (CSG) et en l’augmentant d’un point pour assurer l’équilibre à moyen terme de la Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie (CNAM). »1

Translation by the editorsEliminate the health insurance deficit without penalising either carers or patients by making the Contribution Sociale Généralisée (CSG) progressive and increasing it by one point to ensure the medium-term balance of the Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie (CNAM).

Encoding

ParameterCurrent lawProgrammeEffective date or horizon
Change in all CSG (general social contribution) rates, all bases0 point1 point (assumption by the editors, see the costing)Full year, in 2025 euros

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

+€16bn

per year for the public accounts, new revenue, range +€16bn to +€18bn.

The calculation

  • Change in all CSG (general social contribution) rates, all bases: (1 − 0) ÷ 1 = 1 times “1 point increase in all CSG rates (all bases)”, each a gain of €15.75bn (15.75 to 18).

Assumption by the editors. One-point increase applied to all rates and all bases; progressivity is not costed. At the centre, the gain is net of income tax (12.5%, IPP), assuming the added point is deductible like the 2018 increase; the correction also applies to capital income subject to the flat tax (PFU), where the CSG is not deductible, which reduces the gain by at most €0.25bn. The additional 3-point increase in the CSG on capital income (p. 68) is recorded under the “flat tax” lever, with the increase in the flat tax that it accompanies.

Coefficient calculated by the editors from Fipeco, L'impôt sur le revenu et la CSG: the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. CSG at 9.2% on earned income (1.75% allowance for expenses). On pensions: 0%, 3.8%, 6.6% or 8.3% depending on the RFR (reference taxable income). On capital income, the LFSS 2026 raises the rate from 9.2% to 10.6% for part of financial savings income; it remains at 9.2% for property income, real estate capital gains and life insurance. 6.8 points are deductible from income tax. In addition there is the CRDS at 0.5%. Yield: €157bn in 2025 (Fipeco), €153.8bn in 2024 (CCSS).

Horizon. Full year, in 2025 euros. The base is not brought to 2032 value (of the order of +15 to +20% under a nominal growth assumption).

Limits. The figure of €18bn per point comes from Fipeco based on CCSS data (2025 yield): it is a gross yield. A CSG increase falls largely on the deductible portion and reduces income tax: the IPP measures this effect at €0.6bn out of €4.8bn gross for retirees' CSG (12.5%). The IPP measures this 12.5% rate on an increase falling entirely on the deductible portion (note no. 129: rates of 6.6% and 8.3% raised to 9.2%, « avec la même part déductible (6,8 points) » [“with the same deductible portion (6.8 points)”]): the correction applies only to the deductible portion of the levy. Cost schedule rule (central = net): for one point added to all rates, assumed deductible like the 2018 increase, 18 × (1 − 0.125) = €15.75bn net per point, 18 as upper bound; this calculation also applies the correction to the share of the capital base subject to the flat-rate levy, where CSG is not deductible (about €2bn per point, 18 / 9.2): it understates the gain by at most €0.25bn per point. For an average point of CSG on earned income, of which 6.8 points out of 9.2 are deductible: 12.1 × (1 − 0.125 × 6.8 / 9.2) = €11.0bn net (editors' calculation). Calculations by base divide the revenue by 9.2%; for replacement income, taxed at lower rates, this calculation (28 / 9.2 = €3.0bn per point) underestimated the base: the CCSS publishes the value of one point, €3.90bn in 2025 (4.04 forecast for 2026), used since 18 October 2026 (parameter “replacement income”; net at the centre: 3.9 × (1 − 0.125) = €3.41bn, editors' calculation, the increase being assumed deductible like that of 2018). The same table publishes €12.03bn per point on earned income (the cost schedule keeps 111 / 9.2 = 12.1, a negligible difference) and 1.91 on capital. Aligning retirees' CSG with that of people in work also falls within the pensions domain: a microsimulation by RFR (reference taxable income) band would be needed. LFSS 2026 measure on capital: €1.2bn according to the Senate, €0.1bn in 2026 then €1.4bn in 2027 according to the government (press figure). The 1.4-point increase on part of financial savings (LFSS 2026) is already in force. CSG rate on earned income (parameter): coefficient calculated by the editors from the 2025 revenue (€111bn ÷ 9.2 = €12.1bn gross per point, 11.0 net of income tax at the centre), as for the digital services tax; any value other than 9.2% is a linear extrapolation, marked as such. The option “+1 point on earned income only” is worth one step. Abolition of CSG on earned income: costed at its 2025 revenue (€111bn, Fipeco based on the CCSS), like other tax abolitions; this gross revenue goes to the upper bound; at the centre, net of the income tax that the disappearance of the deductible portion would generate, the 12.5% correction applying only to that portion (6.8 points out of 9.2): 111 × (1 − 0.125 × 6.8 / 9.2) = €100.7bn (editors' calculation; 97.1 before 18 October 2026, when the correction applied to all 9.2 points). Static costing: no effect on employment and no feedback from VAT or contributions. CSG and CRDS fully deductible (option, 18 October 2026, editors' calculation): the non-deductible portion is 2.4 points at each rate (9.2%, of which 6.8 deductible, on earned income; 8.3 of which 5.9, 6.6 of which 4.2 and 6.2 of which 3.8 on replacement income; the reduced rate of 3.8% is fully deductible), and the CRDS (0.5%) is not deductible. Additional deductions: earned income, (2.4 + 0.5) × 12.03 = €34.9bn (value of the point published by the CCSS); replacement income, 2.4 × 3.9 × s + 0.5 × 3.9, where s is the share of the base excluding the reduced rate, not published, taken between 0.75 and 1 (€9.0bn to €11.3bn). The lost tax applies to these deductions the 12.5% rate that the IPP measures for the deductible portion of retirees' CSG (the only one read, which the cost schedule also applies to earned income): 4.36 + 1.12 = €5.5bn (lower bound), 5.6 at the centre (s = 0.875), 5.8 (upper bound). Capital income taxed at the flat rate (without deduction) and property income not counted. The average tax rate on deductions on earned income may differ from 12.5%: no source read measures it.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Marine Tondelier

  1. Pour une prospérité écologique, programme des Écologistes, p. 67. Open the document at this page.

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