Déchiffrer 2027

FREN

Overseas territories, François Ruffin

High cost of living overseas: Cap on air fares to and from the overseas territories (Outre-mer)

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Measures against the price gap between the overseas territories and mainland France: price controls, competition, octroi de mer (dock dues). Direction rule: ↑ stronger public intervention on prices.

« C’est pourquoi nous plafonnerons le prix des billets d’avion à destination et en provnenance des Outre-mer. »1

Translation by the editorsThat is why we will cap the price of air tickets to and from the Outre-mer.

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The programme does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Cap on air fares with no level or method: zero cost if imposed on airlines, compensation to be paid if it goes through public service obligations; not decided.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. The octroi de mer, a tax on imports and local production levied by the authorities of the overseas departments and regions (DROM), raised €1.545bn in 2023 and €1.644bn in 2022 (record). It accounts on average for 32% of the operating revenue of DROM municipalities. Its regime expires at the end of 2027 (European decision) and must be reformed. The bill to combat the high cost of living in the overseas territories (presented on 30 July 2025, adopted by the Senate on 28 October 2025, AN no. 2046) has had its examination postponed and has not been promulgated as of the date of the sources consulted.

Horizon. Full year 2032, current €bn. High = 2023 yield uprated by 2% per year until 2032.

Limits. The effect of abolition on prices is debated: in the illustration in the elected officials' study (AMF), the octroi de mer (dock dues) paid by the importer represents 4.4% of the final price and that paid by the consumer 7.9%; the yield of €1.545bn in 2023 is taken from the press (Banque des Territoires, based on OFGL data), not from that study; an upward effect « plus dur pour les ménages modestes » [“harder on low-income households”] according to the Cour. Compensation by the State is the most costly assumption; replacement by another local tax (regional VAT) would cost the State ~0. The 2024 yield was not found. The range is calculated by the editors: low = 2023, central = 2022-2023 average, high = 2023 × 1.02^9. The fate of the bill after the postponement of February 2026 is not confirmed (legislative file not consulted). The balance is that of general government as a whole: abolishing the octroi de mer costs its yield there, whether or not the State compensates local authorities (compensation is an internal transfer). The “suppression-octroi” option therefore takes the amounts of the compensated option, and is used when the text says nothing about compensation; the two options are mutually exclusive (overlap declared). Same range and same sources: €1.545bn in 2023 (Banque des Territoires), more than €1.6bn in 2022 (Maire-info, Cour des comptes).

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

  1. nouspresident.fr, cahier « Pour renouer avec le temps des loisirs ». Read the programme page.

Contest this encoding (prefilled email; procedure and deadlines)