Déchiffrer 2027

FREN

Europe and defence, Marine Tondelier

Defence budget: €6.4bn increase for defence in 2027, that of the current LPM

Direction of change: unchanged, compared with current law.

The lever. Targeted defence effort, as a percentage of gross domestic product, and timetable for reaching it. Direction rule: ↑ greater defence effort.

« Malgré la pression exercée par la dégradation des déficits, le budget 2027 doit dégager les moyens pour répondre aux enjeux de sécurité de notre temps : […] la sécurité géopolitique à l’âge des empires fossiles. Le budget de la défense va progresser de 6,4 milliards d’euros, grâce à la loi de programmation militaire, la défense voit ainsi ses moyens bondir de 11% »1

Translation by the editorsDespite the pressure exerted by worsening deficits, the 2027 budget must free up the resources to meet the security challenges of our time: […] geopolitical security in the age of fossil empires. The defence budget will increase by 6.4 billion euros; thanks to the military programming act, defence thus sees its resources jump by 11%

Budget 2027 : la grande transmission doit financer la grande transition (dossier de presse), 26 August 2026. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme.

Encoding

The position maintains current law: no parameter changes.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

€0bn

per year for the public accounts, zero cost.

The calculation

  • Status quo: The position maintains current law: zero cost compared with current policies.

Assumption by the editors. The dossier takes up the increase provided for by the updated military programming act (law of 16 August 2026: at least 2.5% of GDP in 2030), without its own level of effort: read as maintaining the current trajectory. The programme (pp. 66 and 193) provides for a new military programming act, with no amount.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Act no. 2026-791 of 16 August 2026 updating the 2024-2030 military programming: national defence effort raised from 2% of GDP in 2025 « à 2,5 % au minimum en 2030 » [“to at least 2.5% in 2030”], with the aim of reaching 3.5% by 2035. Payment appropriations for the « Défense » mission: €57.1bn (2026), 63.3 (2027), 69.5 (2028), 72.6 (2029), 75.7 (2030), i.e. €435.7bn over 2024-2030 (+€36bn over 2026-2030). NATO Hague commitment (June 2025): 5% of GDP in 2035, of which at least 3.5% on defence in the strict sense, with a review in 2029.

Horizon. Full year 2032, current €bn, static. 2032 GDP calculated by the editors: 2025 GDP (€2,991.1bn) × nominal growth of 2.5% / 3% / 3.5% per year over 7 years, i.e. €3,556bn / €3,679bn / €3,806bn.

Limits. Cost schedule rule: the reference law is the latest level set by the military programming law in force, at least 2.5% of GDP in 2030, maintained in 2032 (current value of the parameter: 2.5). Beyond 2030, the law sets only a TARGET of 3.5% in 2035, without annual steps: it is not part of the baseline. A position at 3.5% or at 2% is costed by the linear parameter from this baseline; a position “at least 3%” is costed at the 3% floor. Nominal growth of 2.5% to 3.5% per year up to 2032 is a calculation assumption, not an official forecast. The « effort national de défense » (national defence effort) in the NATO sense includes military pensions and differs from the appropriations of the « Défense » mission (€75.7bn in 2030 excluding pensions). The trajectories adopted in the National Assembly and promulgated differ for 2028-2030 (68.3/72.8/76.3 versus 69.5/72.6/75.7): the cost schedule uses the promulgated law. Part of the military aid to Ukraine is funded in the programming law: overlap declared with ending bilateral aid. Initial trajectory of Law no. 2023-703 (article 4), before its update: €53.7bn / €56.9bn / €60.4bn / €63.9bn / €67.4bn from 2026 to 2030 (€400bn over 2024-2030); the update adds about €36bn over 2026-2030 (338.2 versus 302.3) and €8.3bn in 2030 (75.7 versus 67.4). Refusing these €36bn amounts to returning to the initial trajectory: €8.3bn in 2030, i.e. about 0.24 points of 2030 GDP (€3,467bn: 2025 GDP × 1.03^5, the same assumption as for 2032 GDP), maintained in 2032 (editors' calculation).

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Marine Tondelier

  1. Budget 2027 : la grande transmission doit financer la grande transition (dossier de presse), 26 August 2026, p. 4. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme. Read the source (Budget 2027 : la grande transmission doit financer la grande transition (dossier de presse)).

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