Age and contribution period, Marine Tondelier
Long careers: 60 as a priority for those who worked early and in arduous conditions
Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.
The lever. Early retirement for people who started work young: career-start ages taken into account, retirement ages, quarters required. Direction rule: ↑ more numerous or earlier early retirements.
« Abroger l’âge légal de départ à la retraite à 64 ans (réforme Borne) pour revenir immédiatement à un âge minimum à 62 ans et viser une retraite à 60 ans en priorisant / réinstaurer la retraite à 60 ans pour les personnes ayant travaillé tôt et dans des conditions pénibles. »1Translation by the editorsRepeal the legal retirement age of 64 (Borne reform) to return immediately to a minimum age of 62 and aim for retirement at 60 by prioritising / reinstate retirement at 60 for people who worked early and in arduous conditions.
Encoding
No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The programme does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
not costed
Retirement at 60 as a priority for people who have « travaillé tôt et dans des conditions pénibles » [“worked early and in arduous conditions”], with no career-start age or list of occupations: nothing to cost. The 2023-type extension in the cost schedule does not match this scope.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Early retirement for long careers (Art. L. 351-1-1 CSS (Social Security Code), widened in 2023): retirement possible from 58 at the earliest (thresholds at 58, 60, 62 and 63 depending on the age at which the career began), with the required period and 4 to 5 quarters contributed before 16, 18, 20 or 21. The LFSS 2026 adjusts only the 62 threshold and the required period for the 1964 to 1968 cohorts (COR 2026).
Horizon. Full year 2030 for the 2023 broadening (the only official costing available). The 2016 total is a size benchmark, not the cost of a measure.
Limits. No recent official costing (2024-2026) has been found for a standard broadening, for example retirement at 60 for all those who started before 20. The cost depends on the age thresholds and the required period. It interacts strongly with the legal retirement age: the Cour des comptes assumes the thresholds unchanged when the age falls and shifted when it rises, which explains the asymmetry of its costings. The figure of €6.1bn (2.3% of total pensions in 2016) predates 2023 and serves only to give an order of magnitude. A current value would require a DSS source or the old-age PQE of the PLFSS 2027. Total early-retirement pensions (€6.1bn in 2016) are a size benchmark, not the cost of a measure.
- Sénat, L'essentiel PLFRSS 2023 (étude d'impact et DSS), 2023-03-13: « renforcement du dispositif carrières longues (0,6 milliard) […] (4) Pour l’essentiel, nouveaux aménagements au dispositif de départ anticipé au titre des carrières longues (0,7 milliard). Source : Étude d’impact du PLFRSS et DSS »
- COR, Rapport annuel juin 2026, aménagement de la carrière longue par la suspension, 2026-06: « Cet aménagement ne concerne toutefois pas les quatre bornes d’âge prévues par le dispositif et s’applique uniquement à celle fixée à 62 ans »
- COR, Rapport annuel juin 2026, note 221, 2026-06: « le dispositif de retraite anticipée pour carrière longue permet aux générations nées à compter de 1944 de partir à la retraite avant l’âge minimal de droit commun et au plus tôt à 58 ans depuis la réforme des retraites 2023 »
- Institut Montaigne 2022, fiche Macron 65 ans (archive), 2022-04: « 2,3 % de la masse des pensions versées – soit 6,1 Md€ en 2016 (12) – ne serait pas concerné par la réforme »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- Pour une prospérité écologique, programme des Écologistes, p. 116. Open the document at this page.
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