Institutions, François Ruffin
Article 49.3 and revision of the Constitution: Article 13: Parliament can block an appointment by simple majority
Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.
The lever. Article 49.3 (adoption of a law without a vote, unless there is a motion of censure) and other changes to the Constitution, up to a new Republic. Direction rule: ↑ greater executive powers over Parliament.
« Pour mettre fin au pouvoir exorbitant de nominations du Président de la République, nous proposons de revoir l’article 13 de la Constitution pour que les parlementaires puissent s’opposer à une nomination à une majorité simple. »1Translation by the editorsTo put an end to the President of the Republic's exorbitant power of appointment, we propose to revise Article 13 of the Constitution so that parliamentarians can oppose an appointment by a simple majority.
Encoding
No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.
Costing
Announced by the candidate
not announced
The programme does not cost this measure.
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
lever that cannot be costed
Lever with no coefficient in the cost schedule: the position is compared, not costed.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Article 49 para. 3 of the Constitution: the Prime Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, make the passing of a text an issue of the Government's responsibility. Since the 2008 revision, this is possible only for finance bills and social security financing bills, plus one other text per session. Revision of the Constitution: article 89, either by referendum or by Congress with a 3/5 majority.
Horizon. Not applicable.
Limits. Procedural lever, with no direct budgetary effect. A revision adopted by referendum costs the price of a vote: see the ric lever (€0.1bn to €0.2bn per vote).
- Constitution, texte en vigueur (Conseil constitutionnel): « Art. 49 al. 3 : « Le Premier ministre peut, après délibération du conseil des ministres, engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement » ; art. 89 al. 3 : « Toutefois, le projet de révision n'est pas présenté au référendum lorsque le Président de la République décide » »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- Cahier « Pour séparer l'argent de l'État ». Read the programme page.
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