Unemployment, Gabriel Attal
Unemployment, max. benefit duration: Continuation of the 2024 reform, read as 15 months of benefits at most
Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.
The lever. Maximum period during which a jobseeker can receive unemployment benefit, depending on age and work history. Direction rule: ↑ longer benefit period.
« C’est pourquoi je porte une réforme de l’assurance chômage qui incite au travail et qui créerait 100 000 emplois supplémentaires. »1Translation by the editorsThat is why I am championing an unemployment insurance reform that encourages work and that would create 100,000 additional jobs.
Encoding
| Parameter | Current law | Programme | Effective date or horizon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maximum benefit duration before age 55 | 18 months | 15 months* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation) (assumption by the editors, see the costing) | Full year, steady state (around 2027-2029), €bn per year |
Costing
Announced by the candidate
amount not broken down
Amount announced with no readable annual amount for this position alone: Report of the interview with Le Parisien (3 July 2026): « la reprise de la réforme de l'assurance chômage initiée lorsqu'il était Premier ministre afin de remettre les Français en emploi et de générer 5 milliards d'euros d'économies » [“the resumption of the unemployment insurance reform initiated when he was Prime Minister in order to get the French back into work and generate 5 billion euros of savings”]
Published costings
none
No external costing of this position recorded to date.
Our calculation
+€2.1bn* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation)
per year for the public accounts, saving, range +€2.1bn to +€2.3bn.
* Outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 18 to 24 months).
The calculation
- Maximum benefit duration before age 55: (15 − 18) ÷ 1 = -3 times “1 more month of maximum duration (between 18 and 24 months, under 55)”, each a cost of €0.7bn (0.7 to 0.75). Proposed value outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 18 to 24 months). Range measured by Unédic: gap between 18 and 24 months (2023 countercyclicality reform). Outside this interval, linear extrapolation, flagged as such. Central value brought down to the smallest amount (€0.7bn per step).
Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. Reading adopted: the report of the interview with Le Parisien published by the campaign website (3 July 2026, https://attalpresident.fr/actualites/dans-le-parisien-gabriel-attal-vise-le-zero-deficit-en-2037) announces « la reprise de la réforme de l'assurance chômage initiée lorsqu'il était Premier ministre » [“the resumption of the unemployment insurance reform initiated when he was Prime Minister”]; the « Dette de l'État » page of the programme says this reform was launched in 2024 and prevented from coming into force by the dissolution: these are the June 2024 rules, read as for Bruno Retailleau. For the duration, their maximum benefit duration of 15 months, instead of 18 today before age 55; below 18 months (range measured by Unédic, 18 to 24 months), linear extrapolation. These rules were costed by Unédic against the law at the time, since amended (agreement of 15 November 2024, 2026 amendment): the cost schedule coefficient is applied to current law. Claimants after a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle), already compensated for 15 months at most since 1 September 2026, are included in the coefficient: the gain is overestimated by part of the savings from the amendment (€0.72bn to €0.945bn in all). Not costed: the rules for older workers. The eligibility condition of the same rules (8 months of work in the last 20) is costed under the “access” lever. The announced savings (€5bn in the report, « plus de 4 milliards » [“more than 4 billion”] on the « Dette de l'État » page) cover the whole reform and are not used.
Coefficient calculated by the editors from Unédic, Réforme 2023 : premiers effets de la réforme de contracyclicité: the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.
Central value brought down to the smallest amount: gain acknowledged as overestimated, since claimants after a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle), already compensated for 15 months at most, are included in the coefficient; for this parameter, the lower bound of the coefficient (€0.7bn per month) is also its central value.
Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule
Current law. Maximum duration: 18 months under 55 since countercyclical modulation (coefficient 0.75 since 1 February 2023). Older workers: 22.5 months at 55 and 56, 27 months from 57 (agreement of 15 November 2024). After a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle) concluded on or after 1 September 2026: 15 months under 55, 20.5 months from 55 (Act No. 2026-470 of 11 June 2026, order of 19 June 2026).
Horizon. Full year, steady state (around 2027-2029), €bn per year
Limits. The linear coefficient is calculated by the editors: €4.2bn of benefits (Unédic, February 2023) divided by 6 months, i.e. €0.7bn per month; 0.75 as upper bound with the funding of supplementary pensions. « Net » convention: the €4.5bn saving includes €0.3bn that Unédic pays to the supplementary pension funds (Agirc-Arrco), a flow between general government bodies; the central value (€4.2bn) excludes it, the upper bound (4.5) includes it. The true profile is not linear: the last months cost less, as many claimants return to work before their entitlements end. The €4.5bn saving assumes « une conjoncture stable » [“stable economic conditions”]: if unemployment exceeds 9%, the duration automatically goes back up. Amendment on negotiated terminations (ruptures conventionnelles): €720m to €945m per year according to Unédic, €940m once the reform is fully in force (Senate report, the Unédic note not being published). Context: in 2026, the scheme's spending (€46.6bn) exceeds its revenue (€44.3bn), i.e. a balance of −€2.3bn (Unédic forecast of 17 June 2026; €46.3bn and €44.2bn in the March forecast). The options « suppression de la contracyclicité » [“abolition of countercyclicality”] (2023 reform) and « abrogation de la réforme 2019-2021 » [“repeal of the 2019-2021 reform”] (amount lever) relate to distinct reforms: the 2023 one was costed on the law resulting from the 2021 one, and Unédic adds the two together (€6.7bn at steady state, February 2023, table A); declared overlap, with zero common base: the two add up for the same candidate. The duration parameter and the option abolishing countercyclicality relate to the same mechanism (declared overlap). The June 2024 rules (a decree never applied) were costed by Unédic against the law of the time, since amended (agreement of 15 November 2024, 2026 amendment): no costing read relative to current law.
- Unédic, Réforme 2023 : premiers effets de la réforme de contracyclicité, 2025-12-18: « de l'ordre de 4,5 Md€ par an […] à l'horizon 2027 ; limitée à 18 mois maximum hors filière seniors ; respectivement 22,5 et 27 mois »
- Code du travail numérique, Rupture conventionnelle et chômage : nouvelles durées au 1er septembre 2026, 2026: « moins de 55 ans : 15 mois (18 auparavant) ; 55-56 ans : 20,5 mois ; 57 ans et plus : 20,5 mois (27 auparavant) ; Loi n° 2026-470 du 11 juin 2026 »
- Sénat, rapport n° 488 (2025-2026), commission des affaires sociales, sur le projet de loi portant transposition de l'avenant n° 3 du 25 février 2026 relatif à l'assurance chômage (pages 8 et 14 du PDF), 2026-03-31: « Selon l’Unédic, la réduction de la durée maximale d’indemnisation post-rupture conventionnelle permettrait ainsi d’économiser entre 720 et 945 millions d’euros par an […] Selon les projections de l’Unédic, une telle évolution des règles produirait une économie de 20 millions d’euros la première année, puis 270 millions la deuxième année, 760 millions la troisième année et enfin 940 millions une fois la réforme pleinement portée. »
- Unédic, « Situation financière de l'assurance chômage à horizon 2028 », prévision du 17 juin 2026 (page 1), 2026-06-17: « les dépenses d’assurance chômage augmenteraient en 2026 (46,6 Md€, contre 45,3 Md€ en 2025) […] elles s’élèveraient à 44,3 Md€ en 2026, contre 45,4 Md€ en 2025 […] la dégradation serait sensible en 2026 : -2,3 Md€. »
- Unédic, « Situation financière de l'assurance chômage pour 2023-2025 », 21 février 2023 (pages 10 et 11, encadré 1 et tableau A), 2023-02-21: « À terme, cette réforme se traduirait par une diminution moyenne du nombre d’allocataires indemnisés de 12 % en année de croisière (soit environ 300 000 personnes selon nos estimations d’impact ex ante) et par des dépenses d’allocations réduites de 4,5 Md€ (dont 4,2Md€ pour les allocations chômage et 0,3 Md€ pour le financement des caisses de retraite complémentaire) en l’absence de retournement conjoncturel. […] Au total, en régime de croisière les deux réformes conduiraient à des moindres de dépenses de 6,7 Md€. […] Tableau A […] Réforme 2021 / Réforme 2023 / Ensemble […] En régime de croisière 2,2 4,5 6,7 »
How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.
- attalpresident.fr, chantier « Travail & salaires » (page non datée). Read the programme page.
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