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Unemployment, Édouard Philippe

Unemployment, max. benefit duration: 12 months maximum for under-50s, « comme l’Allemagne » [“like Germany”]

Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.

The lever. Maximum period during which a jobseeker can receive unemployment benefit, depending on age and work history. Direction rule: ↑ longer benefit period.

« Sur l'assurance chômage, ma direction c'est de faire comme l'Allemagne. […] douze mois maximum pour les moins de 50 ans »1

Translation by the editorsOn unemployment insurance, my direction is to do as Germany does. […] twelve months maximum for the under-50s

Words of Édouard Philippe, LCP, propos recueillis par l’AFP avant l’université d’été du Medef, 27 August 2026. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme.

No programme released. Positions taken from public statements, words of associates or documents of the candidate’s party, each dated and sourced; last recorded on 18 October 2026.

Encoding

ParameterCurrent lawProposedEffective date or horizon
Maximum benefit duration before age 5518 months12 months* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation) (assumption by the editors, see the costing)Full year, steady state (around 2027-2029), €bn per year

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

+€4.2bn* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation)

per year for the public accounts, saving, range +€4.2bn to +€4.5bn.

* Outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 18 to 24 months).

The calculation

  • Maximum benefit duration before age 55: (12 − 18) ÷ 1 = -6 times “1 more month of maximum duration (between 18 and 24 months, under 55)”, each a cost of €0.7bn (0.7 to 0.75). Proposed value outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 18 to 24 months). Range measured by Unédic: gap between 18 and 24 months (2023 countercyclicality reform). Outside this interval, linear extrapolation, flagged as such. Central value brought down to the smallest amount (€0.7bn per step).

Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. 12 months, read as the maximum compensation period before 55 under current law (cost-schedule parameter); below 18 months (domain measured by Unédic, 18 to 24 months), linear extrapolation. The candidate’s age threshold (50) differs from that of current law (55): 50 to 54-year-olds, counted here, would not be affected, and the gain is overestimated accordingly. Claimants after a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle), already compensated for at most 15 months before 55 since 1 September 2026 (law no. 2026-470 of 11 June 2026), are also counted as if they were compensated for 18 months: the gain is further overestimated on this side; Unédic only costs the amendment as a whole (€0.72bn to €0.945bn, seniors included), which does not make it possible to isolate this share, which is therefore not removed. The central coefficient (€0.7bn per month) is already the lower bound of the range: no more cautious amount is published.

Coefficient calculated by the editors from Unédic, Réforme 2023 : premiers effets de la réforme de contracyclicité: the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.

Central value brought down to the smallest amount: gain acknowledged as overestimated, since 50 to 54-year-olds, whom the candidate excludes, are counted; for this parameter, the lower bound of the coefficient (€0.7bn per month) is also its central value.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Maximum duration: 18 months under 55 since countercyclical modulation (coefficient 0.75 since 1 February 2023). Older workers: 22.5 months at 55 and 56, 27 months from 57 (agreement of 15 November 2024). After a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle) concluded on or after 1 September 2026: 15 months under 55, 20.5 months from 55 (Act No. 2026-470 of 11 June 2026, order of 19 June 2026).

Horizon. Full year, steady state (around 2027-2029), €bn per year

Limits. The linear coefficient is calculated by the editors: €4.2bn of benefits (Unédic, February 2023) divided by 6 months, i.e. €0.7bn per month; 0.75 as upper bound with the funding of supplementary pensions. « Net » convention: the €4.5bn saving includes €0.3bn that Unédic pays to the supplementary pension funds (Agirc-Arrco), a flow between general government bodies; the central value (€4.2bn) excludes it, the upper bound (4.5) includes it. The true profile is not linear: the last months cost less, as many claimants return to work before their entitlements end. The €4.5bn saving assumes « une conjoncture stable » [“stable economic conditions”]: if unemployment exceeds 9%, the duration automatically goes back up. Amendment on negotiated terminations (ruptures conventionnelles): €720m to €945m per year according to Unédic, €940m once the reform is fully in force (Senate report, the Unédic note not being published). Context: in 2026, the scheme's spending (€46.6bn) exceeds its revenue (€44.3bn), i.e. a balance of −€2.3bn (Unédic forecast of 17 June 2026; €46.3bn and €44.2bn in the March forecast). The options « suppression de la contracyclicité » [“abolition of countercyclicality”] (2023 reform) and « abrogation de la réforme 2019-2021 » [“repeal of the 2019-2021 reform”] (amount lever) relate to distinct reforms: the 2023 one was costed on the law resulting from the 2021 one, and Unédic adds the two together (€6.7bn at steady state, February 2023, table A); declared overlap, with zero common base: the two add up for the same candidate. The duration parameter and the option abolishing countercyclicality relate to the same mechanism (declared overlap). The June 2024 rules (a decree never applied) were costed by Unédic against the law of the time, since amended (agreement of 15 November 2024, 2026 amendment): no costing read relative to current law.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Édouard Philippe

  1. LCP, propos recueillis par l’AFP avant l’université d’été du Medef, 27 August 2026. Words of Édouard Philippe. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme. Read the source (LCP, propos recueillis par l’AFP avant l’université d’été du Medef).

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