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Unemployment, Fabien Roussel

Unemployment, max. benefit duration: Repeal the unemployment insurance reforms

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Maximum period during which a jobseeker can receive unemployment benefit, depending on age and work history. Direction rule: ↑ longer benefit period.

« une augmentation générale des salaires, leur indexation sur les prix, l’abrogation des réformes de l’assurance-chômage et la construction d’une sécurité d’emploi et de formation »1

Translation by the editorsa general increase in wages, their indexation to prices, the repeal of the unemployment insurance reforms and the construction of an employment and training security system

PCF, « Chômage à 8,3 % : l'argent public doit servir l'emploi, pas les licenciements » (communiqué), 9 August 2026. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme.

No programme released. Positions taken from public statements, words of associates or documents of the candidate’s party, each dated and sourced; last recorded on 18 October 2026.

Encoding

Position linked to an option of the cost schedule, with no parameter to set: see the costing.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

−€4.2bn

per year for the public accounts, new spending, range −€4.5bn to −€4.2bn.

The calculation

  • Abolition of countercyclicality (return to 24 months): Option costed by the source: a cost of €4.2bn (4.2 to 4.5) per year.

Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. Reading adopted: the repeal of the reforms includes the 2023 countercyclical modulation, which sets the maximum duration. The other reforms are not costed here: the 2019-2021 one is costed under the “Benefit amount and tapering” lever; the 2026 amendment on negotiated terminations (ruptures conventionnelles) is not.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Maximum duration: 18 months under 55 since countercyclical modulation (coefficient 0.75 since 1 February 2023). Older workers: 22.5 months at 55 and 56, 27 months from 57 (agreement of 15 November 2024). After a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle) concluded on or after 1 September 2026: 15 months under 55, 20.5 months from 55 (Act No. 2026-470 of 11 June 2026, order of 19 June 2026).

Horizon. Full year, steady state (around 2027-2029), €bn per year

Limits. The linear coefficient is calculated by the editors: €4.2bn of benefits (Unédic, February 2023) divided by 6 months, i.e. €0.7bn per month; 0.75 as upper bound with the funding of supplementary pensions. « Net » convention: the €4.5bn saving includes €0.3bn that Unédic pays to the supplementary pension funds (Agirc-Arrco), a flow between general government bodies; the central value (€4.2bn) excludes it, the upper bound (4.5) includes it. The true profile is not linear: the last months cost less, as many claimants return to work before their entitlements end. The €4.5bn saving assumes « une conjoncture stable » [“stable economic conditions”]: if unemployment exceeds 9%, the duration automatically goes back up. Amendment on negotiated terminations (ruptures conventionnelles): €720m to €945m per year according to Unédic, €940m once the reform is fully in force (Senate report, the Unédic note not being published). Context: in 2026, the scheme's spending (€46.6bn) exceeds its revenue (€44.3bn), i.e. a balance of −€2.3bn (Unédic forecast of 17 June 2026; €46.3bn and €44.2bn in the March forecast). The options « suppression de la contracyclicité » [“abolition of countercyclicality”] (2023 reform) and « abrogation de la réforme 2019-2021 » [“repeal of the 2019-2021 reform”] (amount lever) relate to distinct reforms: the 2023 one was costed on the law resulting from the 2021 one, and Unédic adds the two together (€6.7bn at steady state, February 2023, table A); declared overlap, with zero common base: the two add up for the same candidate. The duration parameter and the option abolishing countercyclicality relate to the same mechanism (declared overlap). The June 2024 rules (a decree never applied) were costed by Unédic against the law of the time, since amended (agreement of 15 November 2024, 2026 amendment): no costing read relative to current law.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Fabien Roussel

  1. PCF, « Chômage à 8,3 % : l'argent public doit servir l'emploi, pas les licenciements » (communiqué), 9 August 2026. Position taken from a document of the candidate’s party or movement, not from a presidential programme. Read the source (PCF, « Chômage à 8,3 % : l'argent public doit servir l'emploi, pas les licenciements » (communiqué)).

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