Déchiffrer 2027

FREN

Unemployment, Bruno Retailleau

Unemployment, max. benefit duration: June 2024 rules, negotiated terminations compensated for 6 months at most

Direction of change: decrease, compared with current law.

The lever. Maximum period during which a jobseeker can receive unemployment benefit, depending on age and work history. Direction rule: ↑ longer benefit period.

« Appliquer les règles de juin 2024, votées et jamais mises en œuvre, et les compléter : le refus d'une troisième offre raisonnable met fin à l'indemnisation. Limiter à six mois et plafonner l'indemnisation des ruptures conventionnelles. »1

Translation by the editorsApply the June 2024 rules, voted and never implemented, and supplement them: refusing a third reasonable offer ends compensation. Limit to six months and cap compensation for negotiated terminations.

Encoding

ParameterCurrent lawProgrammeEffective date or horizon
Maximum benefit duration before age 5518 months15 months* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation) (assumption by the editors, see the costing)Full year, steady state (around 2027-2029), €bn per year

Costing

Announced by the candidate

amount not broken down

Amount announced with no readable annual amount for this position alone: « Un gain annuel de 12,5 à 15,7 milliards d'euros » [“An annual gain of 12.5 to 15.7 billion euros”] for the whole of measure no. 29, of which « 4 à 5 milliards pour l'application des règles de juin 2024, 7 à 8 milliards pour les ruptures conventionnelles » [“4 to 5 billion from applying the June 2024 rules, 7 to 8 billion from negotiated terminations”]

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

+€2.1bn* (outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation)

per year for the public accounts, saving, range +€2.1bn to +€2.3bn.

* Outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 18 to 24 months).

The calculation

  • Maximum benefit duration before age 55: (15 − 18) ÷ 1 = -3 times “1 more month of maximum duration (between 18 and 24 months, under 55)”, each a cost of €0.7bn (0.7 to 0.75). Proposed value outside the range measured by the source: linear extrapolation (measured range: 18 to 24 months). Range measured by Unédic: gap between 18 and 24 months (2023 countercyclicality reform). Outside this interval, linear extrapolation, flagged as such. Central value brought down to the smallest amount (€0.7bn per step).

Assumption by the editors. Partial costing. Reading adopted: « appliquer les règles de juin 2024 » [“apply the June 2024 rules”] means, for duration, their maximum benefit duration of 15 months, instead of 18 today below age 55; below 18 months (range measured by Unédic, 18 to 24 months), linear extrapolation. These rules were costed by Unédic against the law of the time, since amended (agreement of 15 November 2024, 2026 amendment): the cost schedule coefficient is applied to current law, as with Unédic's 2021 estimate for the repeals of the 2019-2021 reform costed for other candidates. The central coefficient (€0.7bn per month) is the lower bound of the range. Claimants after a negotiated termination, already compensated for 15 months at most since 1 September 2026, are included in the coefficient: the gain is overestimated by part of the saving from the amendment (€0.72bn to €0.945bn in all). Not costed: compensation for negotiated terminations limited to six months and capped, from which the candidate expects €7bn to €8bn, the rules for older workers planned in June 2024, and the end of entitlement on the third refusal of a reasonable job offer (obligations lever). The eligibility condition of the June 2024 rules is costed under the “access” lever.

Coefficient calculated by the editors from Unédic, Réforme 2023 : premiers effets de la réforme de contracyclicité: the position is marked as an assumption by the editors.

Central value brought down to the smallest amount: gain acknowledged as overestimated, since claimants after a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle), already compensated for 15 months at most, are included in the coefficient; for this parameter, the lower bound of the coefficient (€0.7bn per month) is also its central value.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Maximum duration: 18 months under 55 since countercyclical modulation (coefficient 0.75 since 1 February 2023). Older workers: 22.5 months at 55 and 56, 27 months from 57 (agreement of 15 November 2024). After a negotiated termination (rupture conventionnelle) concluded on or after 1 September 2026: 15 months under 55, 20.5 months from 55 (Act No. 2026-470 of 11 June 2026, order of 19 June 2026).

Horizon. Full year, steady state (around 2027-2029), €bn per year

Limits. The linear coefficient is calculated by the editors: €4.2bn of benefits (Unédic, February 2023) divided by 6 months, i.e. €0.7bn per month; 0.75 as upper bound with the funding of supplementary pensions. « Net » convention: the €4.5bn saving includes €0.3bn that Unédic pays to the supplementary pension funds (Agirc-Arrco), a flow between general government bodies; the central value (€4.2bn) excludes it, the upper bound (4.5) includes it. The true profile is not linear: the last months cost less, as many claimants return to work before their entitlements end. The €4.5bn saving assumes « une conjoncture stable » [“stable economic conditions”]: if unemployment exceeds 9%, the duration automatically goes back up. Amendment on negotiated terminations (ruptures conventionnelles): €720m to €945m per year according to Unédic, €940m once the reform is fully in force (Senate report, the Unédic note not being published). Context: in 2026, the scheme's spending (€46.6bn) exceeds its revenue (€44.3bn), i.e. a balance of −€2.3bn (Unédic forecast of 17 June 2026; €46.3bn and €44.2bn in the March forecast). The options « suppression de la contracyclicité » [“abolition of countercyclicality”] (2023 reform) and « abrogation de la réforme 2019-2021 » [“repeal of the 2019-2021 reform”] (amount lever) relate to distinct reforms: the 2023 one was costed on the law resulting from the 2021 one, and Unédic adds the two together (€6.7bn at steady state, February 2023, table A); declared overlap, with zero common base: the two add up for the same candidate. The duration parameter and the option abolishing countercyclicality relate to the same mechanism (declared overlap). The June 2024 rules (a decree never applied) were costed by Unédic against the law of the time, since amended (agreement of 15 November 2024, 2026 amendment): no costing read relative to current law.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for Bruno Retailleau

  1. avecretailleau.fr, mesure n° 29 « Réduire les durées et plafonner les allocations chômage ». Read the programme page.

Contest this encoding (prefilled email; procedure and deadlines)