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Income tax and CSG, François Ruffin

Flat-rate levy on capital (flat tax): Criticises the government for refusing to raise the flat tax (position inferred)

Direction of change: increase, compared with current law.

The lever. Single rate applied to dividends, interest and capital gains on securities, tax and social levies included: maintained, increased or return to the income tax scale. Direction rule: ↑ heavier levy on capital income.

« L'examen du budget est à peine entamé et on a déjà compris : la taxe Zucman, c'est non ! Le retour d'un impôt sur la fortune, c'est non ! Le relèvement de la flat tax, c'est encore non ! »1

Translation by the editorsThe examination of the budget has barely begun and we have already understood: the Zucman tax, it's no! The return of a wealth tax, it's no! Raising the flat tax, it's no again!

Words of François Ruffin, Question au Gouvernement n° 894, « Justice fiscale », 22 October 2025. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme.

Encoding

No cost-schedule parameter for this position: see the costing for the reason.

Costing

Announced by the candidate

not announced

The cited source does not cost this measure.

Published costings

none

No external costing of this position recorded to date.

Our calculation

not costed

Position inferred from a criticism of the government, with no proposed rate: nothing to cost.

Current law, sources and limits of the cost schedule

Current law. Flat tax (PFU) of 31.4% since the LFSS 2026: 12.8% income tax and 18.6% social levies (CSG raised to 10.6% for most securities). It was 30% (12.8 + 17.2) from 2018 to 2025. The option for the income tax scale remains open. 2025 yield: €5.3bn of income tax on income and capital gains from securities; €18.5bn of CSG and CRDS on capital income; €14.4bn of other social contributions.

Horizon. Full year, in 2025 euros; to be indexed for 2032.

Limits. Capital income is highly sensitive to taxation: dividends jumped after 2018. Static costing therefore overstates the gain from an increase; behavioural effects are presented separately. The cost of €1.9bn of the PFU in 2019 (€1.3bn in 2018) is the Government's costing, assuming unchanged behaviour, reported by the Senate (general report on the PLF 2018); the same report cites economists' estimates of « une dizaine de milliards » [“around ten billion”] in steady state, not static and not counted. Upper bound: the Institut Montaigne (2022) costs the return to the income tax schedule at €2.1bn to €2.3bn « à assiette constante » [“on a constant base”] (ex ante cost of the PFU of €1.6bn to €1.8bn, updated with the growth in capital income from 2018 to 2022, in 2022 euros), and at €1.5bn with behavioural effects (not counted). Per-point calculations divide the revenue by the rate, without microsimulation.

How to read these amounts. These are static costs and revenues, with no feedback effect, over a full year: nothing on growth, employment or the revenue that economic activity would gain or lose. A higher net cost does not on its own make a worse policy, nor net savings a better one: each programme rests on an economic model (demand-led stimulus, lower compulsory levies, consolidation of the public accounts…) that the cost schedule does not settle. GDP itself measures a volume of activity, not well-being or the usefulness of what is produced. Economic models and feedback effects.

This lever in the method · Costing for François Ruffin

  1. Question au Gouvernement n° 894, « Justice fiscale », 22 October 2025. Words of François Ruffin. Position taken from public statements, not from a written programme. Read the source (Question au Gouvernement n° 894, « Justice fiscale »).

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